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I. INTRODUCTION
The year is 1948—Jackie Robinson made his Major League Baseball debut the year before,1 television sets were only beginning to enter
the homes of Americans,2 Disneyland was still a figment of Walt Disney’s imagination,3 and Audrey Hepburn had not yet risen to fame.4
Hollywood studios and the “silver screen” dominated the entertainment industry.5 And, in this same year, the Supreme Court handed
down an antitrust decision that would completely change the structure
of the motion picture industry.6
The first half of the twentieth century saw the birth of Hollywood’s Golden Age, where Hollywood and its major studios thrived
as one of the biggest businesses in America.7 By the 1930s, the eight
major studios—Columbia Pictures Corporation (“Columbia Pictures”), Universal Corporation (“Universal”), and United Artists Corporation (“United Artists”)—practically controlled all three phases of
the movie industry: production, distribution, and exhibition.8 The major studios effectively used this control to exclude their competitors
from the market.9 However, this came to an end in 1948 when the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) won its antitrust action against the major
studios.10 The Supreme Court held that the studios violated the
1. Nick Anapolis, Robinson Debuts Five Days After Signing with Dodgers, NAT’L
BASEBALL HALL OF FAME, https://baseballhall.org/discover/inside-pitch/robinson-signs-first-bigleague-contract [https://perma.cc/3LY9-SK4L].
2. PAULA LANDRY & STEPHEN R. GREENWALD, THE BUSINESS OF FILM: A PRACTICAL
INTRODUCTION 11–12 (2d ed. 2018).
3. Construction of Disneyland began in 1954 and its doors opened in 1955. See Disneyland
Opens, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/disneyland-opens [https://perma.cc
/YR8E-E7MH].
4. Audrey Hepburn did not receive her first starring role in Roman Holiday—for which she
won both an Academy Award and a Golden Globe Award—until 1953. Susan King, Audrey Hepburn’s 1953 ‘Roman Holiday’ an Enchanting Fairy Tale, LA TIMES (Dec. 12, 2013, 5:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/la-xpm-2013-dec-12-la-et-mn-oscar-archives-a
udrey-hepburn-roman-holiday-20131212-story.html [https://perma.cc/PU65-JV72].
5. See THOMAS SCHATZ, THE GENIUS OF THE SYSTEM: HOLLYWOOD FILMMAKING IN THE
STUDIO ERA 412 (2010).
6. See U.S. Supreme Court Decides Paramount Antitrust Case, HISTORY, https://www.histo
ry.com/this-day-in-history/u-s-supreme-court-decides-paramount-antitrust-case [https://perma.cc
/E452-8D9K].
7. See Tom Schatz, The Studio System and Conglomerate Hollywood, in THE
CONTEMPORARY HOLLYWOOD FILM INDUSTRY 13, 15 (Paul McDonald & Janet Wasko eds.,
2008).
8. Michael Conant, The Paramount Decrees Reconsidered, 44 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79,
80 (1981).
9. See id.
10. U.S. Supreme Court Decides Paramount Antitrust Case, supra note 6.
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Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 (“Sherman Act”) and ordered their illegal scheme dismantled.11 As a result, the studios each signed consent
decrees, collectively known as the Paramount Consent Decrees (“Paramount Decrees”).12
[The Paramount] Decrees required the movie studios to separate their distribution operations from their exhibition businesses . . . [and] banned various motion picture distribution
practices, including block booking (bundling multiple films
into one theatre license), circuit dealing (entering into one license that covered all theatres in a theatre circuit), resale
price maintenance (setting minimum prices on movie tickets), and granting overbroad clearances (exclusive film licenses for specific geographic areas).13
The Sherman Act14 prohibits illegal restraints of trade by two or
more actors (section 1), or unilaterally by a monopolist (section 2).15
In the early days of antitrust, most violations under section 1 were per
se, meaning the conduct was illegal on its face. When alleging a per
se violation, “plaintiffs are not required to define the relevant product
markets or show that the defendant has market power in a relevant
market.”16 However, most modern jurisprudence relies on the rule of
reason approach, in which the court defines the relevant market and
balances the procompetitive justifications against the anticompetitive

11. Id.
12. United States v. Paramount Pictures Inc., [1948–1949 Trade Cas.] Trade Regul. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 62,335 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 1948) [hereinafter RKO Decree]; United States v. Paramount
Pictures Inc., [1948–1949 Trade Cas.] Trade Regul. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 62,337 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 1949)
[hereinafter Paramount Decree]; United States v. Loew’s Inc., [1950–1951 Trade Cas.] Trade
Regul. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 62,765 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 1951) [hereinafter Warner Bros. Decree]; United
States v. Loew’s Inc., [1950–1951 Trade Cas.] Trade Regul. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 62,861 (S.D.N.Y.
June 7, 1951) [hereinafter Twentieth Century-Fox Decree]; United States v. Loew’s Inc., [1952–
1953 Trade Cas.] Trade Regul. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 67,228 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 1952) [hereinafter Loew’s
Decree]; United States v. Loew’s Inc., [1950–1951 Trade Cas.] Trade Regul. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 62,573
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 1950) [hereinafter Columbia/Universal/United Artists Decrees]. Electronic copies of the Paramount Decrees are available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/paramount-decree-review
[https://perma.cc/DTT9-T5XS].
13. Press Release, Off. of Pub. Affs., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Federal Court Terminates Paramount
Consent Decrees (Aug. 7, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-court-terminates-paramou
nt-consent-decrees [https://perma.cc/KP79-59C3].
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2018).
15. Id. §§ 1–2.
16. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 106 (2007),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/chapter-5-antitrust-issues-tying-and-bundling-intellectual-propertyrights [https://perma.cc/B3DB-SJUM].
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effects of the conduct that restrains trade in the defined market.17 If the
procompetitive justifications outweigh any anticompetitive effects,
the conduct is found to be a reasonable restraint of trade; if the opposite is true, the conduct is found to violate the Sherman Act.18
After a civil antitrust suit has been filed by the government, the
parties may opt to enter into a consent decree, which essentially
equates to a settlement agreement between the prosecuting government agency and the defendant(s).19 At any point in the litigation, the
government can instead choose to enter into a settlement with the defendant(s), where the government “terminates its suit in exchange for
the defendant’s willing acceptance of ‘specific limitations on his future conduct.’”20 Consent decrees have been “an important feature of
the civil antitrust litigation conducted by the Department of Justice.”21
The court reviews the consent decree and may approve it only if the
court determines that it is in the “public interest.”22 The court retains
“equitable power over its decrees,” so parties who are subject to the

17. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason, 70 FLA. L. REV. 81, 83 (2018) (“Courts evaluate
most antitrust claims under a ‘rule of reason,’ which requires the plaintiff to plead and prove that
defendants with market power have engaged in anticompetitive conduct. To conclude that a practice is ‘reasonable’ means that it survives antitrust scrutiny. This is in contrast to antitrust’s ‘per se’
rule, in which power generally need not be proven and anticompetitive effects are largely inferred
from the conduct itself.”); Michael A. Carrier, The Four-Step Rule of Reason, 33 ANTITRUST 50,
51 (2019), https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/ANTITRUST-4-step-R
oR.pdf [https://perma.cc/4YXR-VSJ6] (“Courts confront a challenging task when assessing a restraint’s anticompetitive and procompetitive effects. They typically are required to define markets,
quantify competitive effects, and balance different types of competitive harm and procompetitive
synergies.”).
18. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
19. See Jonathan A. Schwartz, Note, Bringing Balance to the Antitrust Force: Revising the
Paramount Consent Decrees for the Modern Motion Picture Market, 27 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 45,
54 (2019).
20. Id. (quoting Note, Flexibility and Finality in Antitrust Consent Decrees, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1303, 1303 (1967)); 15 U.S.C. § 16(b).
21. Michael E. DeBow, Judicial Regulation of Industry: An Analysis of Antitrust Consent Decrees, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 353, 353. In fact, consent decrees are used in a majority of modern
civil antitrust cases brought by the government. DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG & JOSHUA D. WRIGHT,
ANTITRUST SETTLEMENTS: THE CULTURE OF CONSENT 178 (Nicolas Charbit et al. eds., 2013)
(“The Antitrust Division[] first entered into a consent decree in a case in United States v. Otis
Elevator Company in 1906. . . . By the 1980s, 97 percent of civil cases filed by the Division resulted
in a consent decree, and that percentage remained relatively constant at 93 percent in the 1990s.
This trend has continued, with the Division resolving nearly its entire antitrust civil enforcement
docket by consent decree from 2004 to present. The Federal Trade Commission has experienced a
similar increase in the use of consent decrees as a proportion of enforcement activity. . . . Since
1995, the FTC has settled 93 percent of its competition cases.” (footnotes omitted)).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(1); see DeBow, supra note 21, at 355.
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decree may return to the court to file motions seeking modification or
termination.23
Modern decrees are not perpetual and usually include a sunset
provision of ten years, but many earlier antitrust consent decrees had
no sunset provisions or termination dates.24 In 2018, the DOJ decided
to look into these “legacy” consent decrees to determine whether they
should be terminated or modified.25 The DOJ began this initiative because the “judgments are perpetual, regardless of whether there have
been subsequent industry or technological changes that might make
those judgments either ineffective in protecting competition or even
anticompetitive themselves.”26 Therefore, the DOJ would unilaterally
move to terminate “legacy” decrees “that no longer serve their original
purpose of protecting competition.”27 Assistant Attorney General
Markan Delrahim encapsulated the negative impact of these legacy
decrees in a simple statement: “The perpetual consent decrees call to
mind the famous line from the Eagles song, ‘Hotel California’: ‘You
can check out any time you like, but you can never leave.’”28
At the time the DOJ initiated its review, there were 1,300 of these
“legacy” judgments, and included in this number were the Paramount
Decrees.29 Following a period of public comment—and pushback
from members of the entertainment industry, such as the National Association of Theater Owners,30 the Writers Guild of America,31 and
23. Schwartz, supra note 19, at 55; 15 U.S.C. § 21(c) (2018).
24. In the late 1970s, the DOJ “adopted the general practice of including sunset provisions
that automatically terminate judgments, usually 10 years from entry.” Press Release, Off. of Pub.
Affs., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Department of Justice Announces Initiative to Terminate “Legacy” Antitrust Documents (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-announcesinitiative-terminate-legacy-antitrust-judgments [https://perma.cc/6HBA-66LM].
25. Id.
26. Press Release, Off. of Pub. Affs., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Department of Justice Opens Review
of Paramount Consent Decrees (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justiceopens-review-paramount-consent-decrees [https://perma.cc/JT8U-ZQ96].
27. Judgment Termination Initiative, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Jan. 21, 2022), https://www.justice
.gov/atr/JudgmentTermination [https://perma.cc/4QSY-NNK5].
28. Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Remarks at the Antitrust
Division’s Second Roundtable on Competition and Deregulation (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.just
ice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-makan-delrahim-delivers-remarks-antitrust-division
s-second [https://perma.cc/YJQ8-7HW3].
29. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 26.
30. Nat’l Ass’n of Theatre Owners, Comments on the Department of Justice, Antitrust Division’s Review of the Paramount Consent Decrees (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/atr/page
/file/1102536/download [https://perma.cc/CL3J-VNEA].
31. Writers Guild of Am., West, Inc., Comments on the Paramount Consent Decree Review
(Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1102781/download [https://perma.cc/E3UT-4
NXS].
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the Independent Cinema Alliance32 (among others), who worried
about reversion to the conduct prohibited by the Paramount Decrees—
the DOJ decided to file a motion with the court asking that the Paramount Decrees be repealed.33 The DOJ determined that, among other
things, the industry’s structure no longer invited the anticompetitive
conduct that necessitated the Paramount Decrees in the late 1940s.34
In 2020, the district court granted the DOJ’s motion to terminate
the Paramount Decrees,35 leading to the question of whether the court
was correct in repealing the decrees or whether the major studios will
return to the actions that warranted antitrust scrutiny years ago. The
question also arises as to why the DOJ decided to push for termination
of these decrees now. The DOJ believed the Paramount Decrees were
unnecessary back in the 1980s but was unwilling to expend its own
resources to file a motion seeking termination.36
The simplest answer lies in the changing landscape of the entertainment industry, with the rising prominence of streaming platforms
and other competitors, such as Disney, who are not bound by the strict
requirements of the Paramount Decrees. But, more recently (and likely
just as important), the COVID-19 pandemic37 drastically altered the
traditional structure of the movie industry, as theaters either remained
closed to the public or open at limited capacity, and the importance of
streaming services has continued to grow rapidly. Termination of the
Paramount Decrees allows the signatory studios an opportunity to
evolve with the altered entertainment landscape without having to
jump through any additional hurdles, leveling the playing field in this
brand new game.
With this perspective in mind, this Comment argues that the District Court was correct in its ruling because of the post-Paramount
32. Indep. Cinema All., Comments on the Department of Justice, Antitrust Division’s Review
of the Paramount Consent Decrees (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1102561
/download [https://perma.cc/J68U-72NP].
33. Memorandum in Support of Motion of the United States for an Order Terminating Antitrust Judgments, United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., No. 19-mc-00544 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22,
2019) [hereinafter DOJ Memorandum].
34. Id. at 3.
35. See infra Section III.D.
36. DeBow, supra note 21, at 363.
37. The COVID-19 pandemic began in March 2020 and resulted in mandatory quarantines,
lockdowns, closure of businesses to the public (such as gyms, movie theaters, dining at restaurants,
etc.), and limited contact with other people, including social distancing (remaining a certain distance apart from others) and wearing masks. Kathy Katella, Our Pandemic Year—A COVID-19
Timeline, YALE MED. (Mar. 9, 2021), https://www.yalemedicine.org/news/covid-timeline [https://
perma.cc/EPS3-F2SZ].
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changes in both the movie industry and antitrust law itself. In Part II,
this Comment discusses the relationship between antitrust and the entertainment industry before Paramount, placing the industry into its
historical context. Part III of this Comment will look at the 1948
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.38 decision and the consent
decrees that followed. In Part IV, this Comment will look at the evolution of specific antitrust law doctrines as well as changes within the
movie industry since the Paramount Decrees. And, in Part V, this
Comment will analyze why the DOJ sought termination now as well
as the concerns of Paramount Decree advocates and argue that the
changes in the structure of the movie industry, the impact of the
COVID-19 pandemic, and the modern approach to antitrust law support termination of the Paramount Decrees.
II. THE COMMINGLED DEVELOPMENT OF ANTITRUST LAW AND THE
MOVIE INDUSTRY
From its inception, the motion picture industry has been intertwined with antitrust law because “[t]he history of the motion picture
industry is one of almost continuous innovations and a succession of
combinations to control markets.”39 The beginnings of Hollywood
“coincided with the introduction of antitrust law, leading to many interactions between the fledgling industry and the nascent body of
law.”40 This part will introduce major players in the early era of the
movie industry and its “studio system,”41 as well as the impact of antitrust law on their operation. The actions of these players serve as a
precursor to the illegal actions of the defendants in United States v.
Paramount Pictures.

38. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
39. MICHAEL CONANT, ANTITRUST IN THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY 16 (1960).
40. Alexandra Gil, Note, Breaking the Studios: Antitrust and the Motion Picture Industry, 3
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 83, 89 (2008).
41. The term “studio system” refers
both to the factory-based mode of film production and also, crucially, to the vertical
integration of production, distribution, and exhibition. The studio system coalesced in
the 1910s and early 1920s via expansion, merger and acquisition, and by the 1930s the
film industry had evolved into what economists term a “mature oligopoly”—that is, an
industry effectively controlled by a cartel of companies.
Schatz, supra note 7, at 14–15.
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A. Beginning of the Movie Industry: Thomas Edison and the Motion
Picture Patents Company
The origins of the American motion picture industry are said to
coincide with Thomas Edison’s invention of, and grant of a patent for,
his motion picture camera (the Kinetograph) in the late 1880s.42 Edison’s Kinetograph “utilized the principles of still photography, but
took pictures at such a rapid speed that, when played on Edison’s Kinetoscope, the images appeared to be moving.”43
Following the law of supply and demand, more competitors attempted to enter the field as the demand for motion pictures increased.44 These companies created equipment that violated Edison’s
patent rights, for which Edison brought patent infringement suits, but
these suits failed to deter the entry of new competitors.45 Alternatively,
these companies imported cameras from Europe to produce their
films.46
By 1908, the leading players in the motion picture industry came
together to form the Motion Picture Patents Company, pooling the
power of their patents together to fend off the increasing number of
smaller firms while simultaneously minimizing the patent disputes
among themselves.47 Through their “collective patent rights, the [Motion Picture Patents Company] was able to control nearly all motion
picture technology,”48 and became so powerful that “it was able to
force Eastman Kodak to withhold raw film stock from producers who
weren’t licensed by [it].”49
Within one year of its existence, the Motion Picture Patents Company brought a number of patent infringement suits against its competitors.50 However, the courts refused to accept an antitrust defense
against the claims of patent infringement,51 stating that “the charge, if
established, that the [Motion Picture Patents Company] is itself, or is
a member of, a combination in violation of the federal anti-trust

42. Gil, supra note 40, at 89–90; CONANT, supra note 39, at 16.
43. Gil, supra note 40, at 90.
44. CONANT, supra note 39, at 17.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 18.
48. Gil, supra note 40, at 92.
49. LANDRY & GREENWALD, supra note 2, at 9.
50. Gil, supra note 40, at 92.
51. Motion Picture Pats. Co. v. Laemmle, 178 F. 104, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1910); Motion Picture
Pats. Co. v. Ullman, 186 F. 174, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1910); Gil, supra note 40, at 92.
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statute, is not a defense available in an action for the infringement of
a patent.”52 But independent producers continued to infringe the Motion Picture Patent Company’s patents because “fines from patent violations were less than profits from filmmaking.”53
Although the Motion Picture Patents Company successfully deterred most producer entry into the exhibition market, some competitors were still able to be part of the industry despite its power.54 As a
result, the Motion Picture Patents Company turned to vertical integration in its effort to “tighten[] its control . . . [and] block the entry of
independent producers into the distribution market.”55 Specifically,
“[i]n 1910 it organized a distribution subsidiary . . . [which] forced the
sale to it of 57 of the 58 principal exchanges and drove the minor exchanges out of business by refusing films to them.”56
In 1912, the DOJ filed an antitrust action against the Motion Picture Patents Company and its subsidiary.57 The district court found
that the defendants engaged in an unreasonable restraint of trade and
formed a monopoly in violation of the Sherman Act. 58 Concurrent
with this antitrust ruling, the Motion Picture Patents Company also
lost key patent cases, one of which reversed the court’s prior position
on the use of an antitrust defense to claims of patent infringement.59
By 1915, the Motion Picture Patents Company was losing its grip of
52. Laemmle, 178 F. at 105.
53. Janet Staiger, Combination and Litigation: Structures of U.S. Film Distribution, 1891–
1917, 23 CINEMA J. 41, 55 (1984).
54. CONANT, supra note 39, at 19 (“Many licensed distribution exchanges secretly marketed
films of nonlicensed producers. A few independent exchanges also induced licensed exhibitors to
rent their nonlicensed films.”).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 20.
58. United States v. Motion Picture Pats. Co., 225 F. 800, 810–11 (E.D. Pa. 1915) (“We are
constrained, however, to find that there was no such relation, but that the end, directly proposed,
was the imposition upon the trade of an undue and unreasonable restraint, in order that, as the
immediate and direct effect and result of the combination, the defendants might monopolize the
trade in all the accessories of the motion picture art so far as they are articles of commerce. . . .
[D]efendants did, in furtherance of the scheme of the combination so to do, directly impose upon
the trade undue and unreasonable restraint, and that such restraint was the end proposed to be directly reached, and was not merely incidental to efforts to protect the rights granted by the patents,
but went far beyond the fair and normal possible scope of any efforts to protect such rights, and
that as a direct and intended result of such undue and unreasonable restrictions the defendants have
monopolized a large part of the interstate trade and commerce in films, cameras, projecting machines, and other articles of commerce accessory to the motion picture business.”).
59. Motion Picture Pats. Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 235 F. 398, 400 (2d Cir. 1916) aff’d,
243 U.S. 502 (1917); Motion Picture Pats. Co. v. Calehuff Supply Co., 248 F. 724 (E.D. Pa. 1918)
(holding the Latham Loop Patent, which had given the Motion Picture Patent Company a near
monopoly on movie cameras, invalid); CONANT, supra note 39, at 20–21.
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power over the industry, as the “success of the government’s antitrust
action encouraged new entry and spurred dissatisfied members to
leave the combine.”60
Despite its short-lived reign of power, the Motion Picture Patents
Company left its footprints throughout the motion picture industry.
For example, Hollywood’s role as the mecca of movies was a direct
result of the Motion Picture Patents Company’s power in New York.
Producers moved to Los Angeles, “where they could make pictures
with machines that infringed the combine’s patents and still be close
enough to the Mexican border to flee in case prosecution was imminent. Output expanded there, and Hollywood became the center of motion picture production.”61
B. Famous Players—Lasky
As the Motion Picture Patents Company was losing its power, another player was quickly gaining it. In 1916, the Famous Players Film
Company (controlled by Adolph Zukor)62 and the Jesse L. Lasky Feature Play Company merged to form the Famous Players-Lasky Corporation.63 As cases against the Motion Picture Patents Company were
being litigated and decided, Famous Players-Lasky was “well on the
way toward domination of the industry.”64
Famous Players-Lasky was a key producer and distributor known
for its development and use of the “block booking” system (which is
“the practice of licensing films in groups by specifically conditioning
the licensing of one film on the acceptance to show one or more other
films”65), vertical integration (owning theaters in addition to being a
producer and distributor), and minimum admission price standards.66
60. CONANT, supra note 39, at 21.
61. Id.
62. Adolph Zukor is known as a “key figure in the development of the motion picture industry.” Adolph Zukor Biography, TCM, https://www.tcm.com/tcmdb/person/23046%7C7612/Adol
ph-Zukor/#biography [https://perma.cc/GMJ3-6DCC].
63. Ralph Cassady, Jr., Impact of the Paramount Decision on Motion Picture Distribution and
Price Making, 31 S. CAL. L. REV. 150, 154 n.33 (1958).
64. Id. at 153–54.
65. Mark Marciszewski, The Paramount Decrees and Block Booking: Why Block Booking
Would Still Be a Threat to Competition in the Modern Film Industry, 45 VT. L. REV. 227, 229
(2020).
66. CONANT, supra note 39, at 23 (“Famous Players-Lasky instituted block booking.”); Marciszewski, supra note 65, at 245 (“Block Booking has been credited to ‘Adolph Zukor, the studio
pioneer who transformed Paramount into Hollywood’s first ever vertically-integrated movie company.’”). Famous Players-Lasky, run by Zukor, was the predecessor to Paramount Pictures. Cassady, supra note 63, at 154.
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In 1921, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)67 brought an antitrust
case against Famous Players-Lasky, alleging a conspiracy to restrain
trade and create a monopoly in the production and distribution of motion pictures.68 The “key distribution practice attacked was block
booking,”69 and Famous Players-Lasky was ordered to cease its anticompetitive block booking practice.70 The court of appeals refused to
enforce the block booking prohibition because Famous PlayersLasky’s share of domestic releases and rentals had dropped, decreasing its market power, which led the court to find a “state of free competition in the industry” and thus no violation of the Sherman Act.71
Famous Players-Lasky’s antitrust troubles were not over, however. In
1916 it merged with Paramount Picture Corporation and would eventually become known as Paramount Pictures, Inc., one of the eight defendants in United States v. Paramount Pictures.72
III. UNITED STATES V. PARAMOUNT PICTURES AND THE PARAMOUNT
CONSENT DECREES
Keeping in mind the storied relationship between the movie industry and antitrust law noted above, the focus now turns to the antitrust case that arguably had the biggest impact on the development and
direction of the movie industry.
A. Introduction to the Paramount Defendants and Case History
Just as the leading companies came together to form the Motion
Picture Patents Company years before, the “new industry leaders
sought to protect their business interests as well.”73 The studios turned
to vertical integration, which involves a company “acquir[ing] outlets
67. For a description of the FTC enforcement process, see The Enforcers, FED. TRADE
COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/enforcers
[https://perma.cc/UP3T-9YUS].
68. In re Famous Players-Lasky, 11 F.T.C. 187 (1927).
69. CONANT, supra note 39, at 27; In re Famous Players-Lasky, 11 F.T.C. at 206–07.
70. In re Famous Players-Lasky, 11 F.T.C. at 211–12.
71. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Paramount Famous-Lasky Corp., 57 F.2d 152, 155–56 (2d Cir.
1932).
72. Cassady, supra note 63, at 154 n.33 (“Famous Players-Lasky Corporation was organized
in 1916 by a merger of Famous Players Film Company (controlled by Adolph Zukor) and the Jesse
L. Lasky Feature Play Company. In 1914, the Paramount Pictures Corporation had been formed to
distribute the Zukor product. In 1917, production and distribution were integrated through the acquisition of Paramount. In April, 1927, the corporation name was changed to Paramount Famous
Lasky Corporation, and in 1935 it became known as Paramount Pictures, Inc.”).
73. Charles H. Grant, Anti-Competitive Practices in the Motion Picture Industry and Judicial
Support of Anti-Blind Bidding Statures, 13 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 349, 354 (1989).
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above and below it on a production line. The result is that a company
controls all phases of manufacturing [(production)], wholesaling [(distribution)], and retailing [(exhibition)].”74
The Paramount defendants fell into two main groups: (1) the five
majors and (2) the three minors. The five major defendants (“Five Majors”) were those that produced, distributed, and exhibited films: Paramount, Loew’s, RKO, Warner Brothers, and Fox. The three minor
defendants (“Three Minors”) were further divided into two categories:
Columbia Pictures and Universal, which only produced and distributed films, and United Artists, which only distributed films.75
1. Production
Seven of the Paramount defendants (all except United Artists)
produced their own films.76 In the five film seasons from 1934–1939,
the seven producer-defendants made 62.2 percent of all movies.77 This
number is a somewhat misleading description of power, however, as
the producer-defendants and the independents affiliated with United
Artists accounted for almost all of the class-A (i.e., best quality) movies.78 However, by 1945, there were approximately forty “independent
producers of feature films in Hollywood.”79 In addition to the rise of
independent studios, by the time of the Paramount litigation, it was
found that although the Paramount defendants owned a majority of
total studio space, “a number of them rented the space to other independents.”80
2. Distribution
Distribution of films essentially deals with the “wholesaling sector of the industry,” and all eight of the Paramount defendants engaged in this portion of the film market.81 During the period of the
Paramount litigation, the Paramount defendants were the largest
74. Id.
75. CONANT, supra note 39, at 34.
76. United Artists did not produce their own films; however, they would work with independent producers. See Cari Beauchamp, United Artists Marks 100 Years of Independent Filmmaking,
VARIETY (Oct. 4, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://variety.com/2019/film/spotlight/chaplin-pickford-united
-artists-marks-100-years-of-independent-filmmaking-1203358514/ [https://perma.cc/8MS6-8UR
W].
77. CONANT, supra note 39, at 36.
78. Id. at 36–37.
79. Id. at 37.
80. Id. at 38.
81. Id. at 43.
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distributors of films: of the eleven firms that had nationwide distribution systems, eight of them were the Paramount defendants.82 The defendants released 71 percent of domestic films during 1936–1946;
however, “almost all of the class A [films]—the only type shown in
leading theaters—were distributed by the eight defendants.”83 Furthermore, the eight defendants received 95 percent of domestic film rentals from 1935–1940 and 94 percent of total film rentals for the 1943–
1944 season.84
All of the Paramount defendants, except United Artists, licensed
their films in “blocks or indivisible groups before the pictures had actually been produced.”85 This practice almost exclusively impacted the
independent exhibitors (exhibitors that were not affiliated with any of
the Paramount defendants) because the Paramount defendants could
not “impose block booking on the affiliated theaters of the other . . .
majors without suffering retaliatory action of the same type.”86 With
the limited number of available screens (since, unlike today, all theaters only had one screen), block booking prevented the independents
from having their movies played in the exhibitors’ theaters. The “effect of block booking as a long-run market policy, when followed by
seven distributors in combination, was to preempt independent exhibitors’ playing time and thus foreclose entry into the market to independent distributors.”87
3. Exhibition
Only the Five Majors owned theaters and, in 1945, their theater
circuits accounted for 17.35 percent of all movie theaters in the United
States, and approximately 25 percent of total seating capacity.88 The
defendants’ theaters, for the most part, were in different geographic
locations and, in locations where two or more of the Five Majors
owned theaters, they would create pooling agreements or joint ownership arrangements89 to share in the profits: “[T]here is no doubt that
82. Id. at 34, 43.
83. Id. at 44.
84. Id. at 44–45.
85. Id. at 77.
86. Id. at 78–79.
87. Id. at 79.
88. Id. at 48–49.
89. Pooling refers to theaters where two or more exhibitor-defendants, or an exhibitor-defendant and an independent exhibitor, who are “normally competitive, . . . operate[] as a unit, or [are]
managed by a joint committee or by one of the exhibitors, the profits being shared according to
prearranged percentages.” United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 149 (1948).
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Paramount, Warner [Brothers], Fox, and RKO owned or operated theatres either in largely separate market areas or in pools, without more
than trifling competition among themselves or with Loew’s.”90 Firstrun theaters were those that were awarded the first exhibition of a film
in a given area91 and, collectively, the Five Majors “controlled more
than 70 per cent of the first-run theaters in the 92 largest cities.”92 The
Paramount defendants relied on one another to obtain pictures “for
use in their various theatres . . . [and] to obtain theatre outlets for their
own pictures, for the best customers of any defendant were ordinarily
one or more of the other defendants.”93
4. Case History
In 1938, the DOJ filed its initial complaint against the eight Paramount defendants in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York.94 Before trial, in 1940, the DOJ and the Five
Majors entered into a consent decree.95 The Three Minors did not consent to the decree and were therefore not bound by its terms.96 The
1940 decree was to last for three years and merely “put minor restrictions on trade practices but left undisturbed the major circuits’
first-run theater monopolies in a majority of major American cities.”97
The substance of the 1940 decree included a prohibition on blind selling98 and unreasonable clearances, agreement by the Five Majors that
they would not expand theater holdings for three years, and limitation
of block booking to five movies.99
In 1944, after the three-year window of the 1940 decree, the DOJ
reactivated the case and moved for trial against all of the Paramount
defendants.100 The DOJ’s complaint accused the defendants of
90. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 881, 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1949)
91. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 144 n.6.
92. CONANT, supra note 39, at 50. “Largest Cities” refers to cities with over 100,000 population. Id.
93. Paramount Pictures, 85 F. Supp. at 893.
94. CONANT, supra note 39, at 94–95.
95. The 1940 decree “contained no admission of violation of law and adjudicated no issue of
fact or law, except that the complaint stated a cause of action.” Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at
141 n.3.
96. CONANT, supra note 39, at 95.
97. Id. at 95, 106.
98. Blind selling is a practice where “a distributor licenses a feature before the exhibitor is
afforded an opportunity to view it.” Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 157 n.11.
99. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 66 F. Supp 323, 331–33 (S.D.N.Y. 1946);
CONANT, supra note 39, at 95–97.
100. CONANT, supra note 39, at 97.

(12) 55.4_MINASSIAN_V10 (DO NOT DELETE)

1182

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

10/14/2022 1:55 PM

[Vol. 55:1167

“combining and conspiring unreasonably to restrain trade and commerce in the production, distribution, and exhibition of motion pictures and to monopolize such trade and commerce in violation of the
Sherman Act.”101 The ultimate goal of the DOJ in bringing this suit
was to “undermine the entire studio system, which relied on a stable
and consistent market for its standardized products, which in turn generated the cash flow that enabled the studios to pay their operating
(overhead) costs and maintain their contract personnel” and create “an
industry in which movies were produced and sold on a picture-by-picture and theater-by-theater basis.”102
B. Holdings
The district court found that the defendants “through illegal horizontal collusion and a cartel had (1) monopoly power in the distribution market for first-run motion pictures; and (2) engaged in a conspiracy to fix licensing practices, including admission prices, run
categories, and clearances for substantially all theaters located in the
United States.”103 The district court disagreed with the allegations in
the DOJ’s complaint regarding production and held that the defendants had not monopolized the production market.104
Specific illegal conduct noted by the district court included: price
fixing arrangements, unreasonable clearances, pooling agreements,
joint ownership, formula deals, master agreements, franchises, block
booking, and discrimination.105 The district court’s chosen remedy

101. Paramount Pictures, 66 F. Supp at 330.
102. SCHATZ, supra note 5, at 411–12.
103. DOJ Memorandum, supra note 33, at 10.
104. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 140 (1948). “Effective combination for direct control of production output was not possible in the motion picture industry. Heterogeneous inputs (in the form of stories and actors) and highly differentiated, continuously changing
film product were factors promoting innovation and the entry of independent producers.” CONANT,
supra note 39, at 37.
105. The following is a more detailed description of the various anticompetitive and illegal
actions the district court, and ultimately the Supreme Court, found the Paramount defendants engaged in:
1. Horizontal Price Fixing: A minimum price fixing conspiracy was inferred between all the defendants because the minimum prices were nearly uniform across all licenses. Paramount Pictures,
334 U.S. at 141–42.
2. Vertical Price Fixing: A minimum price fixing conspiracy existed between each distributordefendant and its licensees based on express agreements. Id. at 142.
3. Clearances: A clearance is:
[T]he period of time, usually stipulated in license contracts, which must elapse between
runs of the same feature within a particular area or in specified theatres. Runs are
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was to institute a process of competitive bidding, where “films
[were] . . . offered to all exhibitors in [a] competitive area. The license
for the desired run [was] to be granted to the highest responsible bidder . . . [and] all licenses [were] to be offered and taken theatre by theatre, picture by picture.”106
successive exhibitions of a feature in a given area, first-run being the first exhibition in
that area, second-run being the next subsequent and so on.
Id. at 144 n.6. “Clearances are designed to protect a particular run of a film against a subsequent
run.” Id. at 144. The Court found that the defendants’ clearances were unreasonable because they
“had no relation to the competitive factors which alone could justify them.” Id. at 146.
4. Pooling Agreements: Theaters where two or more exhibitor-defendants, or an exhibitor-defendant and an independent exhibitor, who are “normally competitive, . . . operate[] as a unit, or [are]
managed by a joint committee or by one of the exhibitors, the profits being shared according to
prearranged percentages.” Id. at 149. These agreements would “eliminate competition pro tanto
both in exhibition and in distribution of features, since the parties would naturally direct the films
to the theatres in whose earnings they were interested.” Id.
5. Joint Ownership:
Many theatres are owned jointly by two or more exhibitor-defendants or by an exhibitordefendant and an independent. The result is . . . that the theaters are operated “collectively, rather than competitively.” . . . Joint ownership between exhibitor-defendants
then becomes a device for strengthening their competitive position as exhibitors by forming an alliance as distributors.
Id. at 150–51.
6. Formula Deals:
[A] licensing agreement with a circuit of theatres in which the license fee of a given
feature is measured, for the theatres covered by the agreement, by a specified percentage
of the feature’s national gross . . . The inclusion of theatres of a circuit into a single
agreement gives no opportunity for other theatre owners to bid for the feature in their
respective areas and . . . is therefore an unreasonable restraint of trade.
Id. at 153.
7. Master Agreements: A master agreement is “a licensing agreement or ‘blanket deal’ covering the
exhibition of features in a number of theatres, usually comprising a circuit.” Id. at 142 n.4. These
were found to be illegal restraints of trade because they “eliminate[d] the possibility of bidding for
films theatre by theatre . . . [and] diverting the cream of the business to the large operators.” Id. at
154. It was also found to be a misuse of monopoly power. Id. at 154–55.
8. Franchises: A franchise is “a licensing agreement, or series of licensing agreements, entered into
as part of the same transaction, in effect for more than one motion picture season and covering the
exhibition of features released by one distributor during the entire period of the agreement.” Id. at
142 n.4. The district court found that these were restraints of trade because “a period of more than
one season was too long and the inclusion of all features was disadvantageous to competitors.” Id.
at 155.
9. Block Booking: The Court held that this practice “prevents competitors from bidding for single
features on their individual merits . . .[and] ‘adds to the monopoly of a single copyrighted picture
that of another copyrighted picture which must be taken and exhibited in order to secure the first.’”
Id. at 156–57.
10. Discrimination: “The District Court found that defendants had discriminated against small independent exhibitors and in favor of large affiliated and unaffiliated circuits through various kinds
of contract provisions.” Id. at 159. These provisions were only granted to the larger circuits and
gave “competitive advantages . . . so great that their inclusion [in the circuit contracts]” constituted
unreasonable discrimination against small independents. Id. at 160.
106. Id. at 161.
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On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s finding
that the defendants violated the Sherman Act.107 However, the Supreme Court disagreed with the district court’s remedy of competitive
bidding and instead instructed the district court to fashion a remedy
that would “uproot all parts of an illegal scheme—the valid as well as
the invalid—in order to rid the trade or commerce of all taint of the
conspiracy” and “undo[] what the conspiracy achieved.”108
C. On Remand: Paramount Consent Decrees Signed
Before a decision was reached on remand, RKO and Paramount
entered into consent decrees divesting their theater holdings.109 With
regard to the other six defendants, the district court, following the Supreme Court’s instruction, issued its final decree ordering “a divorcement or separation of the business of the defendants as exhibitors of
films from their business as producers and distributors.”110 The decrees for the remaining Five Major defendants (Warner Brothers, Fox,
and Loew’s) prohibited each “distributor from reentering exhibition . . . unless [it] showed to the court that such entry would not unreasonably restrain competition.”111 The district court held that this
was the “only adequate means of terminating the conspiracy and preventing any resurgence of monopoly power on the part of the remaining defendants.”112 Because Paramount and RKO consented to decrees
prior to the district court’s opinion, they avoided “any requirement to
seek court approval to reenter exhibition in the future.”113
In addition to requiring the defendants to divest their theater holdings, the Paramount Decrees “restricted the ways in which all the Defendants could license and distribute movies to theatres.”114 Namely,
the Paramount Decrees barred the defendants from “[r]esale price
maintenance—setting minimum movie ticket prices; . . . [u]nreasonable clearances—granting exclusive film licenses for overly broad geographic areas; . . . [conditional] block booking—bundling multiple
films in one theatrical license; . . . [and] circuit dealing—licensing a

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 141–61, 178; see supra note 105.
Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 148, 171.
Schwartz, supra note 19, at 79.
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 881, 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
CONANT, supra note 39, at 105.
Paramount Pictures, 85 F. Supp. at 896.
Schwartz, supra note 19, at 78–79.
DOJ Memorandum, supra note 33, at 12.
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film to all theaters under common ownership or control instead of theatre by theatre.”115
D. Fast Forward 70+ Years: The Paramount Decrees Are
Terminated
On August 7, 2020, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York terminated the Paramount Decrees, “effective immediately, except for a two-year sunset period on the . . . provisions banning block booking and circuit dealing.”116 The court held
that termination of the Paramount Decrees was in the “public interest”117 because (1) the Paramount Decrees accomplished their goal of
resetting the market to competitive conditions; (2) changes in the industry make it unlikely that the Paramount defendants would “once
again limit their film distribution to a select group of theaters”; (3)
“[c]hanges in antitrust law . . . suggest that the potential for future violation is low” and the “legal framework used to evaluate the [Paramount] Decrees’ film licensing practices . . . has also changed”; and
(4) current antitrust laws are “an effective deterrence.”118

115. Id.
116. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., No. 19 Misc. 544, 2020 WL 4573069, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2020).
117. When the government seeks to terminate a consent decree, the court must determine
whether such termination would be in the “public interest.” Id. at *3.
The Tunney Act [(statutory procedures governing the DOJ’s antitrust consent decrees)]
lays out two sets of factors for the court to consider. First, the court assesses the decree’s
competitive impact, including the duration of relief sought, the anticipated effects of
alternative remedies actually considered by the DOJ, and “any other considerations bearing upon the adequacy” of the decree. Second, the court should examine the impact of
the consent decree “upon the public generally and individuals alleging specific injury”
from the violations stated in the complaint. . . . Courts have generally deferred to the
DOJ and approved decrees with little fanfare.
Joseph G. Krauss et al., The Tunney Act: A House Still Standing, ANTITRUST SOURCE 2 (2007),
https://www.hoganlovells.com/~/media/hogan-lovells/pdf/publication/tunneyact_pdf [https://per
ma.cc/Q9CF-H7QD]. Although the language in the Tunney Act applies to approving an antitrust
consent decree, the Second Circuit has held “that termination also requires judicial supervision—
and ‘consider[ation of] the public interest’—as a corollary to the Tunney Act.” United States v.
Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 163 F.3d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Am. Cyanamid
Co., 719 F.2d 558, 565 (2d Cir. 1983)). “[T]he Court, in making its public interest finding [for
termination of a decree], should . . . carefully consider the explanations of the government . . . and
its responses to comments in order to determine whether those explanations are reasonable under
the circumstances.” Paramount Pictures, 2020 WL 4573069, at *3.
118. Paramount Pictures, 2020 WL 4573069, at *3–8.
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IV. CHANGES IN LAW AND INDUSTRY POST-PARAMOUNT
Since the Paramount decision came down and the Paramount Decrees were entered into in the late 1940s and early 1950s, there have
been evolutions in both the interpretation of antitrust law as well as
the in the overall structure of the movie industry. As described in more
detail below, this Comment agrees with the district court’s assessment
that these changes support termination of the Paramount Decrees.
A. State of Antitrust Jurisprudence Post-Paramount
The Sherman Act, which governs antitrust law and which has
been called the “Magna Carta of free enterprise” by the Supreme
Court,119 condemns anticompetitive conduct that results unilaterally
from a monopoly,120 or from two or more actors agreeing to restrain
trade.121 Section 1 analysis under the Sherman Act is further divided
by whether the suspected anticompetitive agreement is horizontal or
vertical. Horizontal agreements occur when direct competitors conspire to restrict trade. Vertical agreements, in contrast, are the result of
a conspiracy to restrain trade by companies at different levels of the
distribution chain.
Although the Sherman Act states that “every” anticompetitive
“contract [and] combination”122 is illegal, the Supreme Court has held
that only “unreasonable restraints” of trade are unlawful.123 Certain
agreements and types of activity are presumed to be anticompetitive
on their face and are therefore per se violations. These agreements are
ones that “would always or almost always tend to restrict competition
and decrease output.”124 If an agreement does not fall under a category
deemed per se unlawful, it is analyzed under the rule of reason to determine its anticompetitive effect.125 Under the rule of reason, the trier
of fact balances the anticompetitive effects against the procompetitive
benefits arising from the agreement.126 If the anticompetitive effects
119. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
120. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018).
121. Id. § 1.
122. Id.
123. See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 63–67 (1911).
124. Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007) (quoting Bus.
Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988)).
125. See infra note 130 and accompanying text for examples of per se categories under section
1 of the Sherman Act.
126. See, e.g., O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1070 (9th Cir.
2015).
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outweigh the procompetitive justifications, the agreement is found unlawful.127 However, if the opposite is true, the agreement is not found
to violate the Sherman Act despite some anticompetitive effect on the
market (i.e., the agreement is treated as a reasonable restraint of
trade).128 Today the default analysis under section 1 of the Sherman
Act is the rule of reason,129 except for a limited number of specific
categories deemed per se unlawful, such as horizontal price fixing and
market divisions.130
Congress drafted the Sherman Act as a “common law statute” and
the courts are expected to provide an evolving interpretation as economic thinking progresses.131 So, interpretation of the Sherman Act
should (and usually does) change as economic thinking evolves.132 At
a broad level, modern antitrust jurisprudence has “distanced itself
from the more enthusiastic interventionism characterizing the first
sixty years of the Sherman Act’s existence.”133 In looking at the current state of antitrust law, this Comment will focus on the evolution of
certain antitrust doctrines surrounding vertical agreements, tying arrangements, clearances and circuit dealing (which was the conduct
that was the focus of the Paramount defendants’ antitrust violations),
and the impact of such evolution on the logic behind the Paramount
Decrees.

127. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 885–86.
128. See id.
129. Id. at 885 (“The rule of reason is the accepted standard for testing whether a practice restrains trade in violation of § 1.”).
130. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (holding horizontal price fixing per se illegal); Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990) (holding horizontal market divisions per se illegal).
131. State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 20–21 (1997) (“Thus, the general presumption that
legislative changes should be left to Congress has less force with respect to the Sherman Act in
light of the accepted view that Congress ‘expected the courts to give shape to the statute’s broad
mandate by drawing on common-law tradition.’”); Leegin, 551 U.S. at 899–900 (“From the beginning the Court has treated the Sherman Act as a common-law statute. . . . Just as the common law
adapts to modern understanding and greater experience, so too does the Sherman Act’s prohibition
on ‘restraint[s] of trade’ evolve to meet the dynamics of present economic conditions. The case-bycase adjudication contemplated by the rule of reason has implemented this common-law approach.
Likewise, the boundaries of the doctrine of per se illegality should not be immovable. For ‘[i]t
would make no sense to create out of the single term “restraint of trade” a chronologically schizoid
statute, in which a “rule of reason” evolves with new circumstances and new wisdom, but a line of
per se illegality remains forever fixed where it was.’” (citations omitted)).
132. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 899–900.
133. Schwartz, supra note 19, at 55.
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1. Vertical Agreements
In the early days of antitrust enforcement, vertical agreements
were categorically illegal as per se violations. In the landmark decision
of Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,134 the Supreme
Court held:
[A]greements or combinations between dealers, having for
their sole purpose the destruction of competition and the fixing of prices, are injurious to the public interest and void.
They are not saved by the advantages which the participants
expect to derive from the enhanced price to the consumer.135
Dr. Miles remained the Supreme Court’s precedent (for vertical minimum price agreements) for over 100 years.136
The modern Court, in a trilogy of major cases, challenged the
older Court’s per se approach to vertical agreements.137 In Continental
Television, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,138 the Supreme Court held that
vertical non-price agreements—vertical divisions of territory or customer restrictions—should be analyzed under the rule of reason.139 In
doing so, the Court noted that per se is only applicable when the agreement is always or almost always anticompetitive, and the Court felt
that was not the case with vertical non-price agreements.140 Similarly,
the Court held in State Oil Co. v. Kahn141 that an agreement between
a buyer and a seller to resell a product at a maximum price falls under
the rule of reason.142 Finally, in Leegin Creative Leather Products v.
PSKS, Inc.,143 the Court overruled Dr. Miles and held that vertical
agreements to set a minimum price are subject to the rule of reason.144
These “vertical restraints, once thought to reduce competition and foster illegal monopolistic structures, were now often thought to aid

134.
135.
136.
137.

220 U.S. 373 (1911).
Id. at 408.
See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 907.
For an in-depth discussion of the developments in vertical restraints, see J. THOMAS
ROSCH, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF VERTICAL RESTRAINTS: 2012 1–50 (2012), https://www
.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/developments-law-vertical-restraints-201
2/120507verticalrestraints.pdf [https://perma.cc/UA8H-67T9].
138. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
139. Id. at 37.
140. Id. at 49–50, 57.
141. 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
142. Id. at 22.
143. 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
144. Id. at 907.
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competition and help the economic environment,”145 reflecting the
evolution of economic thinking and the resulting impact on antitrust
law.
The Court in Paramount, aligned with the law stated in Dr. Miles,
held that vertical minimum price fixing arrangements were per se violations of the Sherman Act.146 The Paramount Decrees permanently
enjoined the signatory studios “from granting any license in which
minimum prices for admission to a theatre are fixed by the parties.”147
Therefore, the change in the Court’s jurisprudence regarding vertical
minimum price fixing is not applicable to the studios bound by the
Paramount Decrees, while all other competitors, such as Disney, can
engage in such activity so long as it does not violate the rule of reason.
Furthermore, although Leegin, in overturning Dr. Miles, dealt with
“resale price restrictions on [physical] goods sold by retailers, the
[governmental] Agencies [(i.e., the DOJ and FTC)] apply the Leegin
analysis to pricing restrictions in [intellectual property] licensing
agreements. Accordingly, the Agencies analyze vertical price restrictions in licensing agreements under the rule of reason.”148 Therefore, terminating the Paramount Decrees allows the signatory studios
to be on equal footing with their competitors regarding the legality of
vertical minimum price fixing arrangements.
2. Tying Arrangements
Tying arrangements occur when a seller, as a condition of purchasing one product (Product A), requires a buyer to also purchase
another product (Product B).149 Product A is the tying product, and
145. Kraig G. Fox, Note, Paramount Revisited: The Resurgence of Vertical Integration in the
Motion Picture Industry, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 505, 520 (1992).
146. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 143 (1948).
147. Paramount Decree, supra note 12. Each of the Paramount Decrees “enjoins [this] conduct.” Gerald F. Phillips, The Recent Acquisition of Theatre Circuits by Major Distributors, 5 ENT.
& SPORTS L. 1, 14 (1987).
148. Directorate for Fin. & Enter. Affs. Competition Comm., Licensing of IP Rights and Competition Law—Note by the United States, ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV. 10 (June 6, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1313541/download [https://perma.cc/LMQ6-L4TS]; see also
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 5.2 (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/atr/IPguidelines/down
load [https://perma.cc/2FJ7-9REG] (“As with [Minimum Resale Price Maintenance] agreements
that apply to outright sales of goods, the Agencies will apply a rule of reason analysis to price
maintenance in intellectual property licensing agreements. The Agencies will analyze vertical price
restrictions in licensing agreements on a case-by-case basis, evaluating the competitive benefits
and harms from such agreements. Agreements constituting a horizontal cartel will be considered
per se illegal.”).
149. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
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Product B is the tied product. Before and during the era of the 1948
Paramount case, the Court viewed tying as a per se violation, where
the requirement to purchase two products together was viewed by the
Court as unlawful and anticompetitive on its face.150 The Court believed that “[t]ying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the
suppression of competition.”151
Since then, however, the Supreme Court has modified its assessment of tying arrangements. Now, these arrangements “are recognized
as having significant procompetitive benefits and are therefore subject
to a form of per se legality.”152 In Jefferson Parish Hospital District
No. 2 v. Hyde,153 the Supreme Court articulated a “quasi per se” rule
where a tying arrangement is per se unlawful if: (1) the seller is selling
two separate products or services;154 (2) the seller has market power
in the tying market;155 and (3) the tying arrangement forecloses “a substantial volume of commerce” in the tied market.156
When looking at the rule set forth by the Supreme Court in Jefferson Parish, it becomes evident that tying is not really a per se category because “any inquiry into the validity of a tying arrangement
must focus on the market or markets in which the two products are
sold, for that is where the anticompetitive forcing has its impact.”157
In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor argued for a rule of reason approach because the “per se” tying doctrine adopted by the majority
“incurs the costs of a rule-of-reason approach without achieving its
benefits: the doctrine calls for the extensive and time-consuming economic analysis characteristic of the rule of reason, but then may be
interpreted to prohibit arrangements that economic analysis would
show to be beneficial.”158 In the years since Jefferson Parish was decided, the quasi per se approach “is increasingly interpreted as tracing
O’Connor’s rule of reason approach, ‘allow[ing] defendants to prove

150. See Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 395–96 (1947), abrogated by Ill. Tool
Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5.
151. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305–06 (1949).
152. Schwartz, supra note 19, at 95.
153. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
154. Id. at 21 (“[A] tying arrangement cannot exist unless two separate product markets have
been linked.”).
155. Id. at 13–18.
156. Id. at 16.
157. Id. at 18.
158. Id. at 34–35 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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procompetitive justifications that would indicate that a given tie produced a net increase in consumer welfare.’”159
a. Evolution of Tying Arrangements Within the Entertainment
Industry
The Paramount Court agreed with the jurisprudence of its time
and viewed the tying arrangement engaged in by the Paramount defendants, block booking, as a per se violation of antitrust.160 Block
booking is “the practice of licensing, or offering for license, one feature or group of features on condition that the exhibitor will also license another feature or group of features released by the distributors
during a given period.”161 The Court reiterated this view in its 1962
decision in United States v. Loew’s, Inc.,162 where it was tasked with
evaluating whether the block-booking limitations established by Paramount would apply to the sale of pre-1948 films to television networks.163 Here, the Court again found that the tying arrangements
were per se violations following the reasoning it had set forth in the
Paramount decision.164 The Court contended that “[a]ppellants cannot
escape the applicability of Paramount Pictures. A copyrighted feature
film does not lose its legal uniqueness because it is shown on a television rather than a movie screen.”165 Both the Paramount and Loew’s
decisions illustrate “antitrust law’s hostility to tying agreements at the
time.”166
More recently, the Ninth Circuit was asked to address a modern
form of block booking in Brantley v. NBC Universal, Inc.167 In that
case, the plaintiffs (retail cable and satellite television subscribers) argued that two tying arrangements existed in violation of the Sherman
Act.168 First, programmers (companies such as NBC Universal who
own television programs and channels) tied their cable channels together, utilizing their market power to condition the sale of “high159. Schwartz, supra note 19, at 96 (quoting Einer Elhauge, Rehabilitating Jefferson Parish:
Why Ties Without a Substantial Foreclosure Share Should Not Be Per Se Legal, 80 ANTITRUST
L.J. 463, 494 (2015)).
160. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 157–59 (1948).
161. Id. at 156.
162. 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
163. Id. at 39–40.
164. See id. at 55.
165. Id. at 48.
166. Schwartz, supra note 19, at 98.
167. 675 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 998 (2012).
168. Id. at 1195.
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demand” cable channels on the purchase of all of the programmers’
“low-demand” channels.169 Second, when distributors (companies
such as Time Warner and EchoStar) sold channels to consumers, the
consumers were “required to purchase each Programmer’s low-demand channels . . . in order to gain access to that Programmer’s highdemand channels, which [the consumers] do not want.”170 The plaintiffs sought to “compel [the] programmers and distributors . . . to sell
each cable channel separately, thereby permitting plaintiffs to purchase only those channels that they wish[ed] to purchase.”171
Applying the rule of reason to these tying arrangements,172 the
court ultimately held that the plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege that
the arrangements caused an injury to competition.173 In so holding, the
Ninth Circuit noted that
courts distinguish between tying arrangements in which a
company exploits its market power by attempting “to impose
restraints on competition in the market for a tied product”
(which may threaten an injury to competition), and arrangements that let a company exploit its market power “by merely
enhancing the price of the tying product” (which does not).174
Further, the court reasoned that “market conditions may be such
that a specific tying arrangement does not have anticompetitive
effects.”175 The Brantley court’s “logic appears directly adverse
to the principles articulated in Paramount and extended by
Loew’s” which viewed tying arrangements as per se violations.176
Instead, the Ninth Circuit seems to follow the logic set forth in
169. Id. at 1200–01.
170. Id. at 1201.
171. Id. at 1195.
172. Id. at 1197. The court noted that the “per se” rule only applies to tying arrangements in
“some circumstances,” and the parties here agreed that the tying arrangements were not per se
violations. Id. at 1197 n.7 (“A tying arrangement will constitute a per se violation of the Sherman
Act if the plaintiff proves ‘(1) that the defendant tied together the sale of two distinct products or
services; (2) that the defendant possesses enough economic power in the tying product market to
coerce its customers into purchasing the tied product; and (3) that the tying arrangement affects a
not insubstantial volume of commerce in the tied product market.’” (quoting Cascade Health Sols.
v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 913 (9th Cir. 2008))).
173. Id. at 1204.
174. Id. at 1199 (quoting Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14 (1984)).
175. Id. (“As the Supreme Court has noted, ‘when a purchaser is “forced” to buy a product he
would not have otherwise bought even from another seller in the tied product market, there can be
no adverse impact on competition because no portion of the market which would otherwise have
been available to other sellers has been foreclosed.’” (quoting Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2,
466 U.S. at 16)).
176. Schwartz, supra note 19, at 101.
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Justice O’Connor’s Jefferson Parish concurrence, applying the
rule of reason to the alleged tying arrangement.177 The Supreme
Court denied review of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion.178
b. Impact on Paramount Defendants
While the Paramount defendants were permanently enjoined
from engaging in conditional block booking no matter the circumstance,179 the modern trend seems to indicate the opposite is true for
their competitors. The Brantley court opted to apply the rule of reason
to a modern block booking arrangement, and the Supreme Court’s
“quasi per se” rule requires analysis into the market, with the current
trend of analysis bearing a closer resemblance to rule of reason analysis.180
Furthermore, even the DOJ and FTC undergo a rule of reason
analysis when internally evaluating cases to decide whether they
should exercise “their prosecutorial discretion.”181 The DOJ and FTC
would be “likely to challenge a tying arrangement if: (1) the seller has
market power in the tying product, (2) the arrangement has an adverse
177. See id. at 102–03.
178. Brantley v. NBC Universal, Inc., 675 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S.
998 (2012). While Brantley reflects the modern trend of antitrust jurisprudence in which the court
is unwilling to support expansive antitrust enforcement, there are still some decisions that go
against the general trend. See, e.g., Cablevision Sys. Corp. v. Viacom Int’l Inc., No. 13 Civ. 1278,
2014 WL 2805256, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2014) (holding, on facts similar to Brantley, that
the plaintiff pleaded sufficient facts to allege a blockbooking tying claim under Jefferson Parish’s
“per se” rule to survive a motion to dismiss).
179. See, e.g., Warner Bros. Decree, supra note 12, at 2.
180. Elhauge, supra note 159, at 493–94 (2015) (“Even if one accepted the critics’ mistaken
claim that ties with tying market power usually have positive effects on consumer welfare and total
welfare, their analysis would not support their position that ties without a substantial foreclosure
share should be per se legal. . . . Instead, what their conclusion would justify is a rule of reason
approach. But that is precisely what the current quasi-per se rule provides. It requires evidence of
tying market power to prove that anticompetitive effects on consumer welfare are possible, but
allows defendants to prove procompetitive justifications that would indicate that a given tie produced a net increase in consumer welfare.”); see, e.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of
Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.26 (1984) (“[W]hile the Court has spoken of a ‘per
se’ rule against tying arrangements, it has also recognized that tying may have procompetitive justifications that make it inappropriate to condemn without considerable market analysis.”); PSI Repair Servs., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 104 F.3d 811, 815 n.2 (6th Cir. 1997) (“[U]nder tying’s per se
rule, the seller must possess substantial market power in the tying product market. In addition,
tying’s per se rule provides for an inquiry into whether the defendant’s conduct has procompetitive
effects. Such an extensive factual inquiry is hardly the stuff of per se analysis. Under rule-of-reason
analysis, the antitrust plaintiff must show, inter alia, an adverse effect on competition.”); see also
Christian Ahlborn et al., The Antitrust Economics of Tying: A Farewell to Per Se Illegality, 49
ANTITRUST BULL. 287, 289 (2004) (“[M]odern economic thinking supports a rule of reason approach toward tying.”).
181. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 148, § 5.3 n.70.
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effect on competition in the relevant market for the tying product or
the tied product, and (3) efficiency justifications for the arrangement
do not outweigh the anticompetitive effects.”182 This test is different
from the “quasi per se” rule articulated by the Court in its 1984 Jefferson Parish holding because it guides the prosecutorial agencies to not
only look into the relevant market, but to also balance the procompetitive justifications against the anticompetitive effects—which is the
traditional rule of reason analysis. Therefore, the trend in analyzing
tying arrangements under the rule of reason approach supports termination of the Paramount Decrees because its prohibitions hold only a
handful of industry members to the more antiquated per se rule.183
3. Clearances and Circuit Dealing
Clearances are “the period of time, usually stipulated in license
contracts, which must elapse between runs of the same feature within
a particular area or in specified theatres.”184 In Paramount, the DOJ
argued that clearances were per se illegal. 185 However, the district
court, and ultimately the Supreme Court, refused to view clearances
as per se violations because they may be reasonable restraints of
trade.186 The district court outlined factors for consideration in determining whether a clearance is an unreasonable restraint of trade,
which were reiterated by the Supreme Court in its holding.187
Since Paramount, there have not been cases that analyze the reasonableness of clearances imposed by vertically integrated

182. Id. at § 5.3; see also Directorate for Fin. & Enter. Affs. Competition Comm., supra note
148, at 10 (“Because tying arrangements (including package licensing) can result in procompetitive
benefits and significant efficiencies, the Agencies apply a rule of reason analysis to tying arrangements.”).
183. Though the big picture trend is pushing toward rule of reason tying analysis and limiting
robust antitrust enforcement, the Court’s approach has not been entirely linear as there have been
decisions that still apply the traditional Jefferson Parish quasi-per se tying analysis. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461–79 (1992) (allowing the plaintiff to
survive a motion for summary judgement for a tying claim under the Jefferson Parish standard, and
stating: “We need not decide whether Kodak’s behavior has any procompetitive effects and, if so,
whether they outweigh the anticompetitive effects. . . . In this case, when we weigh the risk of
deterring procompetitive behavior by proceeding to trial against the risk that illegal behavior will
go unpunished, the balance tips against summary judgment.”).
184. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 144 n.6 (1948).
185. Id. at 145.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 145–46. The Supreme Court held that the clearances imposed by the Paramount
defendants were unreasonable because they “had no relation to the competitive factors which alone
could justify them.” Id. at 146.
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distributors,188 but modern cases involving theater clearances are decided under a similar line of reasoning as Paramount.189 These clearances are viewed under the rule of reason because “they can and often
do generate a net benefit to consumers by increasing the selection of
films that theaters offer and stimulating competition on bases other
than film selection.”190 The reasonableness of a clearance “depends on
the competitive stance of the theaters involved and the clearance’s effect on competition, especially the interbrand competition which, as
the Supreme Court has instructed, is [the court’s] primary concern in
an antitrust action.”191 A clearance “may violate antitrust laws if it is
shown to cause actual harm to competition that outweighs any procompetitive benefits of the clearance.”192 Because the law analyzing
clearances has not changed since the Paramount Decrees were entered
into, the Paramount Decrees’ “clearance provisions are not necessary
to protect competition.”193
Circuit dealing occurs when “a dominant movie theater chain [(a
circuit)] . . . uses its market power to obtain preferential agreements,
particularly clearances, from distributors for the licensing of films . . .
in multiple geographic markets.”194 The Paramount Court found circuit dealing to be a per se violation of the Sherman Act and the Supreme Court has not revisited the issue of circuit dealing since.195 In
modern circuit dealing cases, some lower courts have not strayed from
the Paramount Court’s holding when deciding on motions to dismiss.196
188. Flagship Theatres of Palm Desert, LLC v. Century Theatres, Inc., 269 Cal. Rptr. 3d 446,
464 (Ct. App. 2020).
189. See, e.g., Theee Movies of Tarzana v. Pac. Theatres, Inc., 828 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir.
1987).
190. Flagship Theatres of Palm Desert, 269 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 455.
191. Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 1372 (3d Cir. 1996). “Interbrand competition is the competition among the manufacturers of the same generic product . . . and is the
primary concern of antitrust law. The extreme example of a deficiency of interbrand competition
is monopoly.” Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977). Intrabrand
competition, on the other hand, is “the competition between the distributors—wholesale or retail—
of the product of a particular manufacturer.” Id.
192. Flagship Theaters of Palm Desert, 269 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 454–55.
193. DOJ Memorandum, supra note 33, at 37.
194. 2301 M Cinema LLC v. Silver Cinemas Acquisition Co., 342 F. Supp. 3d 126, 130 (D.D.C.
2018). Circuit dealing can occur when an exhibitor “pools the purchasing power of an entire circuit
to ‘eliminate the possibility of bidding for films [on a] theatre by theatre [basis]’” or by “unlawful
monopoly leveraging.” Id. at 132–33 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
195. Flagship Theaters of Palm Desert, 269 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 464.
196. 2301 M Cinema, 342 F. Supp. 3d at 132; Cobb Theaters III, LLC v. AMC Ent. Holdings,
Inc., 101 F. Supp. 3d 1319, 1343 (N.D. Ga. 2015); Cinetopia, LLC v. AMC Ent. Holdings, Inc.,
No. 18-2222, 2018 WL 6804776, at *3–4 (D. Kan. Dec. 27, 2018).
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The California Court of Appeal, however, found that the Supreme
Court’s holding in Paramount regarding circuit dealing was not dispositive because Paramount “addresses circuit dealing in the context
of a unique and distinguishable set of market conditions: vertically integrated film distributors who employed a broad range of anticompetitive practices, including horizontal coordination, to maintain their
monopoly power over an entire industry [and n]o such broad network
of restrictions, nor any horizontal coordination, was alleged” in the
case before it.197 Instead, in Flagship Theaters of Palm Desert v. Century Theaters,198 the California Court of Appeal analyzed the circuit
dealing arrangement before it as a form of vertical restraint under the
rule of reason, consistent with the modern treatment of vertical restraints under the Sherman Act as described in Section IV.A.1
above.199 In doing so, the California Court of Appeal cited federal case
law applying the rule of reason to circuit dealing arrangements.200
However, despite this shift, the Paramount Decrees continue to prohibit circuit dealing as per se violations for the Paramount defendants.201
B. Post-Paramount Changes to the Motion Picture Industry
1. Changes in the Structure of the Motion Picture Industry
a. Paramount Decrees Disrupted the Studio’s Business Model
Pre-Paramount, the production of movies in Hollywood “[had]
been characterized as a factory system akin to that used by a Ford
plant, and Hollywood often praised its own work structure for its

197. Flagship Theaters of Palm Desert, 269 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 464.
198. 269 Cal. Rptr. 3d 446 (Ct. App. 2020).
199. Id. at 469–71; see supra Section IV.A.1.
200. Flagship Theaters of Palm Desert, 269 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 470–71 (citing Cinema Vill. Cinemart, Inc. v. Regal Ent. Grp., No. 15-05488, 2016 WL 5719790 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2016), aff’d,
708 Fed. App’x 29 (2d Cir. 2017)); Six W. Retail Acquisition, Inc. v. Sony Theatre Mgmt. Corp.,
No. 97 Civ. 5499, 2004 WL 691680, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2004), aff’d, 124 Fed. Appx. 73 (2d
Cir. 2005).
201. Paramount Decree, supra note 12, § II(A)(8) (prohibiting defendant from “licensing any
feature for exhibition upon any run in any theater in any other manner than that each license shall
be offered and taken theater by theater, solely upon the merits and without discrimination in favor
of affiliated theatres, circuit theatres or others”); DOJ Memorandum, supra note 33, at 12 (“[T]he
Decrees barred each Defendant from engaging in the following practices: . . . Circuit dealing—
licensing a film to all theatres under common ownership or control instead of theatre by theatre.”).
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efficient mass production of entertaining films.”202 Movie stars, directors, and other talent were contracted to the studio, allowing for the
creation of many films at low cost.203 And, since the studios also
owned theaters, there was a guaranteed arena to exhibit all of these
films.204 The studio system glamorized these movie stars and used
“them to sell . . . movies to the public,” making “the actors . . . the
draw, more than the films” themselves.205 Gene Kelly’s character in
Singin’ in the Rain, Don Lockwood, perfectly illustrates this notion.
However, as a result of the Paramount Decrees, the signatory studios were required to divest of their theater holdings. Not only were
the Five Majors required to “divorce themselves of their theater circuits,” but the court “also ordered the divorced circuits to divest themselves of approximately one-half of the 3,137 theaters they owned in
1945.”206 The divestment of theaters from the studio’s production and
distribution arms “removed the studios’ safety net . . . [and] ‘[w]ith no
guarantee of exhibition, fewer movies could be made. . . . The 1950s
was a time of bust[,] of caution.”207 Since then, the total movie production by the Paramount defendants has continued to decline.208 For
example, MGM (formerly Loew’s), which “distributed 52 movies in
1939, including Gone with the Wind, The Wizard of Oz, and It’s a
Wonderful Life . . . distributed just three movies in 2018. . . . United
Artists . . . distributed 30 movies in 1939 . . . [and] did not distribute a
single movie in 2018.”209
The studios have shifted their focus to “big” blockbuster movies,
and while the “studios finance and release feature films, production
relies on mobilizing largely outsourced creative resources (producers,
artists, and technicians) on a film-by-film basis.”210 Studios “now
rel[y] on independent producers to supply ‘packaged’ projects that the
studios would ‘green light’ for production, putting up some portion of

202. DAVID BORDWELL ET AL., THE CLASSICAL HOLLYWOOD CINEMA: FILM STYLE & MODE
OF PRODUCTION TO 1960, at 90 (1985).
203. Schatz, supra note 7, at 15.
204. See Gil, supra note 40, at 120.
205. LANDRY & GREENWALD, supra note 2, at 9.
206. CONANT, supra note 39, at 106.
207. Gil, supra note 40, at 120.
208. Id. at 119.
209. DOJ Memorandum, supra note 33, at 21.
210. Allègre L. Hadida et al., Hollywood Studio Filmmaking in the Age of Netflix: A Tale of
Two Institutional Logics, 45 J. CULTURAL ECON. 213, 217 (2021).
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the budget in exchange for the distribution rights, and often leasing
out their production facilities as well.”211
However, because studios could no longer rely on the name of a
movie star or studio alone to generate audiences, “‘audience creation’
[became] just as important a creative product as the film itself.”212
Some studios “commit up to $50 million in prerelease advertising on
a single movie.”213 To minimize the cost of this marketing campaign,
the studios often focus on franchises, sequels, and remakes, which already have a guaranteed audience.214 For example, Paramount rejected
a “project that had attached stars, an approved script, and a bankable
director by telling the producer: ‘It’s a terrific idea, too bad it has not
been made into a movie already or we could have done the remake.’
This response . . . is not untypical.”215 The decline in major studio production left a gap between film product and theater demand. The independent producers and smaller studios stepped in to provide product
to fill that gap, “hoping to bring back the movies . . . that the major
studios have largely abandoned.”216
Additionally, after the collapse of the studio system, movie stars
were able to “auction[] off their services to the highest bidder from
film to film.”217 Some stars have used this freedom to work “for near
scale[218] in … indie films [which] allows indie producers to take
211. Schatz, supra note 7, at 16.
212. EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN, THE HOLLYWOOD ECONOMIST: THE HIDDEN FINANCIAL
REALITY BEHIND THE MOVIES 150 (2012).
213. Id. at 151.
214. Id. at 76, 149, 152 (“Studios today, as a former executive explained, tend to green-light
four types of movies for wide openings: remakes (such as King Kong), sequels (such as Star Wars:
Episode III), television spin-offs (such as Mission: Impossible), or video game extensions (such as
Lara Croft: Tomb Raider).”).
215. Id. at 149.
216. Nat’l Ass’n of Theatre Owners, supra note 30, at 5 (“Exhibitors are eager for these studios
and their content to be available on their screens.”); Anne Thompson, Fear of Netflix, Disney’s
Dominance, the Secret Success of MoviePass, and 5 More Things We Learned at CinemaCon,
INDIEWIRE (May 1, 2018, 10:19 AM), https://www.indiewire.com/2018/05/10-things-cinemaconhollywood-future-1201958718/ [https://perma.cc/X2DJ-KHRB] (“Theaters are begging for more
movies in the $50 million-$100 million range to fill their screens, but the studios are increasingly
disinterested. As the studios look for growth outside North America, they increasingly target movies overseas like domestic disappointments ‘Pacific Rim Uprising’ and ‘Tomb Raider.’ Finally,
theaters look to the indies to fill that hole, among them Annapurna-MGM, STX, Global Road, A24,
Entertainment Studios, and Neon.”).
217. EPSTEIN, supra note 212, at 55; see also SCHATZ, supra note 5, at 482 (“For top industry
talent, particularly the leading producers, directors, and stars, declining studio control meant unprecedented freedom and opportunity.”).
218. “When an actor is paid scale, it means they’re making the minimum pay rate allowed by
the production company’s agreement with SAG[-]AFTRA. Sometimes you’ll hear of an ‘A list’
movie actor working for ‘scale’ as a favor on a low-budget project when they would usually get
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advantage of [the] star’s cachet to finance the movies.”219 With the
availability of a market and name actors, the independent movie market has only continued to grow: “While studio-produced blockbusters
are the prime movers in the global movie marketplace, the domestic
US market since the early 1990s has become increasingly split between these major studio releases on the one hand, and low-budget
‘indie’ films on the other.”220
In sum, the studios “responded—and ultimately survived—by
fundamentally changing the way they made movies and did business.”221 And, the changes made by the studios spurred the growth and
increased the role of independent movies in the industry.
b. Film Exhibition: Shift from Single Screens to Multiplexes
From the early days of the movie industry until the 1960s, theaters
only had one screen and could therefore only play one picture at a
time—think of the famous El Capitan Theatre in Hollywood, California, which has been fully restored and currently still operates as a single-screen theater.222 However, with the growth of city suburbs and
rise of shopping centers, theaters began opening multiplexes (theaters
with multiple screens).223 The first multiplex—a double-screened theater—was opened in 1963 by AMC theaters in Missouri.224 By 1969,
AMC had also opened four-screen and six-screen theaters.225 Soon
thereafter, “single-screen theaters nationwide were being converted
into multiplexes . . . caus[ing] many single-screen theaters that were
not renovated to go out of business.”226 And, by the 1990s, “the multiplex was the dominant retail model, sparking an enormous increase
paid hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars for their projects.” Erin Pearson, The Complete
Guide to SAG-AFTRA Paid Scale, TOPSHEET (Jan. 28, 2020), https://topsheet.io/blog/sag-aftra-pa
id-scale [https://perma.cc/66FW-WAFA].
219. EPSTEIN, supra note 212, at 55.
220. Schatz, supra note 7, at 29.
221. Id. at 16.
222. About the Theatre, EL CAPITAN THEATRE HOLLYWOOD, https://elcapitantheatre.com/ab
out-us/ [https://perma.cc/Y2ER-SVPF]; see El Capitan Theatre, FANDANGO, https://www.fandan
go.com/el-capitan-theatre-aacon/theater-page [https://perma.cc/99E4-JKBK] (showing that only
one movie plays at the El Capitan at a time).
223. LANDRY & GREENWALD, supra note 2, at 21.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Erin McDowell, The Rise and Fall of Movie Theaters—And How the Coronavirus Pandemic Might Change Them, BUS. INSIDER (May 26, 2020, 9:02 AM), https://www.businessinsider
.com/photos-that-show-the-rise-and-fall-of-movie-theaters-2020-5
[https://perma.cc/CN38-TK
HZ].
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in the number of available screens.”227 The shift to multiplexes, paired
with the decrease in film production by the major studios, resulted in
more available screens for the independent producers, who “support[ed] the growth of th[is] sector.”228
Because of the restrictions in the Paramount Decrees, however,
the corporations that “had acquired the theater chains of the five major
Paramount defendants met th[is] dynamic change[] in exhibition under the disadvantages of the severe restrictions of the decrees.”229
These successor corporations could not easily sell their downtown single screen theaters and acquire new multiplexes in suburban shopping
centers because
[t]he court treated this in the same way as a net addition to
the circuit and required proof that it would not unduly restrain competition. It was not until 1974 that the district court
agreed to an exception to this rule for theaters newly constructed by one of the five circuits. [However,] . . . this exception did not apply to theaters constructed by others, such
as developers of shopping centers, and then leased or sold to
one of the circuits.230
As a result, the strict requirements of the Paramount Decrees hindered
the ability of these theater circuits to evolve with the changes to movie
exhibition.231
2. Rise of New Competitors and Impact
a. Television
The first major challenge to the studios following the Paramount
Decrees was the advent and growth of television. This was the first
time movies “faced a new competitor for consumers’ ‘eyeballs.’”232
The introduction of television negatively impacted theater attendance.
For example, 1958 movie attendance was “less than half of the size of
227. LANDRY & GREENWALD, supra note 2, at 22.
228. Id.
229. Conant, supra note 8, at 100.
230. Id.
231. “The series of decisions by the district court on petitions of the divorced circuits to acquire
theaters show no clear standards. . . . The cases demonstrate that a costly litigation process was
added to any plans of the five divorced circuits to follow the demographic trend and expand into
the suburban shopping centers. The result was that the five circuits declined as the major central
cities where most of their theaters were located decayed. By 1979 only one of the five former
circuits was still operated by its original successor corporation.” Id. at 100–01.
232. LANDRY & GREENWALD, supra note 2, at 12.
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the 1948 audience.”233 To get people out of their homes and back into
the theaters, “movie-going [turned] into an ‘entertainment experience’
worthy of the price of a ticket and a babysitter.”234 It was no longer
enough “to advertise a famous star [the audience] knows. If you want
to get the crowds to come around you’ve got to have glorious Technicolor, breathtaking Cinemascope, and stereophonic sounds.”235
At first, the studios pushed back against television, refusing to
license their films to television networks because they feared that television would be “the end of the theatrical movie business.”236 However, soon thereafter, the studios realized that licensing their films to
television “establish[ed] lucrative new streams of revenue for the industry.”237 Television would receive the film after it had completed its
theatrical run. The revenue from television showings allowed the studios to survive despite declining theater attendance.238
b. In-Home Entertainment
i. VHS and DVD
After the advent of television, the “introduction of the home video
player in the 1970s marked the next major transition for the film business.”239 Just as with television, the movie industry’s initial “reaction
to home video in the 1970s was one of panic . . . fear[ing] that if consumers could watch a movie at home they would no longer patronize
theaters.”240 However, “[b]y the 1980s, the studios realized that home
video would be immensely profitable” as it provided another avenue
to further capitalize on the blockbuster films that had completed their
theatrical runs.241 Within a short period of time, “home-video licensing and sales had become the largest source of revenue for the film

233. EPSTEIN, supra note 212, at 216.
234. LANDRY & GREENWALD, supra note 2, at 13.
235. Gil, supra note 40, at 120 (quoting SILK STOCKINGS (MGM 1957)).
236. LANDRY & GREENWALD, supra note 2, at 12.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 13 (“By 2000, the major film companies’ income from theatrical exhibition accounted for approximately 20 percent of total revenue, while income from television represented
about 40 percent of revenue. Studios increasingly rely on television revenue (as well as content
licensing and video games) to offset the riskiness of [sic] inherent on the film side.”).
239. Id. at 15.
240. Id. at 187.
241. Id. at 188–89 (“The home-viewing market, whether rental or sell-through, has always been
dominated by films that have been theatrically released. The advertising and marketing that supports a theatrical release powers the visibility of a movie for the home-viewing market.”).
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industry.”242 DVD emerged in 1995, and “[p]rior to the invention of
cell phones, the DVD player was the fastest-selling electronic consumer product in history, and its rapid penetration of the market fueled
significant revenue growth for the film industry from 1999 to
2004.”243 By 2004, “DVDs were bringing into the studios’ coffers
more than twice as much money as the theatrical release of movies.”244
ii. Online Streaming
Perhaps the biggest challenge to the movie industry came with the
rise and dominance of online streaming platforms, such as Netflix.245
At first, the studios saw “online streaming as an additional release window, not fundamentally different from pay-per-view or television,
which they could exploit to compensate for the decline in DVD revenue in the early 2000s.”246 Once streaming services began releasing
original content (for example, Amazon plans to release at least thirty
movies per year and Netflix fifty-five movies per year), the streaming
services were no longer just mediums of licensing films, but competition.247 Streaming services provide convenience to consumers, allowing them to watch unlimited content from the comfort of their homes
or on the go, while also recommending titles to limit a consumer’s
search time—all for a low monthly fee.248 There are approximately
271 streaming services in the United States alone.249 With “the rise of
this technology and widespread popularity, new players in the movie
business[] Netflix, Amazon, and Apple are positioned to threaten the
established Hollywood studios.”250
The movie industry tried to match the streaming model, developing MoviePass in 2017, which “offered customers the option to see
one movie [in theaters] per day for $9.99 a month.”251 But, by 2020,
MoviePass failed and “filed for bankruptcy after running out of

242. Id. at 16.
243. Id. at 189.
244. EPSTEIN, supra note 212, at 137.
245. See Hadida, supra note 210, at 218.
246. Id. at 221.
247. Id. at 221–22.
248. Id. at 220–22.
249. Id. at 221.
250. LANDRY & GREENWALD, supra note 2, at 24–25.
251. Rebecca Rubin, MoviePass Teases Mysterious Relaunch, but It’s Unclear Who’s in
Charge, VARIETY (Mar. 16, 2021, 2:58 PM), https://variety.com/2021/film/news/moviepasscountdown-clock-relaunch-1234932183/ [https://perma.cc/A78J-TMR2].
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cash.”252 The studios had to adapt, and “[o]nce film distributors recognized the potential of streaming services, many decided to create
their own and pull their films from the existing third-party streaming
services.”253 In light of the events surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic, the role of streaming in the movie industry has only continued
to increase to the detriment of theatrical exhibition.254 However, the
silver lining for theaters is that they will never be irrelevant so long as
industry award eligibility—Oscars and Golden Globes—requires a period of theatrical exhibition.255
c. Media Conglomerates
When the Paramount Decrees were signed, Disney was not a major player in the movie industry.256 By the 1980s, Disney “enjoyed the
industry’s leading market share,”257 a position it still possesses. For
example, Disney “accounted for 50% of the total box office in the first
six months of 2018,”258 and in 2019, Disney “represented 38% of the
U.S. movie industry’s” market.259 To state it simply, Disney is “the
largest media powerhouse on the planet.”260 And Disney, who was not

252. Id.
253. Marciszewski, supra note 65, at 279.
254. See infra Sections IV.B.3 and V.B.1.
255. Awards Rules and Campaign Regulations Approved for 93rd Oscars, OSCARS (Apr. 28,
2020, 12:15 AM), https://www.oscars.org/news/awards-rules-and-campaign-regulations-approved
-93rd-oscarsr [https://perma.cc/L43C-TKAL]; Hollywood Foreign Press Ass’n, Golden Globe
Award Consideration Rules, GOLDEN GLOBES 1, 5 (May 31, 2021), https://www.goldenglobes.com
/sites/default/files/2021-07/golden-globe-awards-eligibility-descriptions-2021-revisions-approved
-5-25-21.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TJQ-ZXZL] (explaining that eligibility requires the film to be
“both released [(made available for exhibition in theaters or on a recognized pay-per-view channel
or service)] and screened for the . . . [voting Golden Globes] members[] in the greater Los Angeles
area during the qualifying year (January 1 through December 31).”). Even Amazon and Netflix
“intend to offer limited theatrical release to those films most likely to get high-profile nominations
and awards.” Hadida, supra note 210, at 222.
256. See supra note 12; Disney Company, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Dis
ney-Company [https://perma.cc/2JR8-NLNP]. At the height of the Paramount defendants’ market
power, Disney was just entering the industry and would not begin to flourish until the 1950s and
1960s. Id.
257. Schatz, supra note 7, at 23.
258. This value represents Disney’s total box office share after its acquisition of Fox. Writers
Guild of Am., supra note 31, at 3. Disney “has increased its share of domestic box office by acquiring competitors and reducing output.” Id.
259. Sarah Whitten, Disney Accounted for Nearly 40% of the 2019 US Box Office, CNBC
(Dec. 29, 2019, 3:04 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/29/disney-accounted-for-nearly-40perc
ent-of-the-2019-us-box-office-data-shows.html [https://perma.cc/8BNT-H9N4].
260. Andrew Beattie, Walt Disney: How Entertainment Became an Empire, INVESTOPEDIA
(July 26, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/financial-theory/11/walt-disney-entertain
ment-to-empire.asp [https://perma.cc/5KQQ-NJLG].

(12) 55.4_MINASSIAN_V10 (DO NOT DELETE)

1204

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

10/14/2022 1:55 PM

[Vol. 55:1167

a party to the Paramount case, has never been bound by the prohibitions of the Paramount Decrees.
Meanwhile, “teetering on the brink of collapse,” the Paramount
defendants “fell victim”261 to corporate consolidation, operating as
“divisions of huge media conglomerates” where the “film divisions
are [now] relatively small contributors to the overall revenue and
profit of the[] media groups:”262
Paramount Pictures was purchased by industrial conglomerate Gulf + Western Industries Corporation before being sold
to multimedia company Viacom (today, ViacomCBS) in
1994. Twentieth Century-Fox would survive under semi-independence until 1985 when Rupert Murdoch’s NewsCorp
purchased the studio; it would then be sold in 2018 to the
Walt Disney Company. RKO was sold to General Tire and
Rubber Company in 1955, but would be dissolved soon afterward: it has since been revived as a small, independent
production company. Warner Bros. would eventually merge
with publishing company Time, Inc., forming Time Warner,
which would itself be purchased by AT&T in 2018. MGM
and United Artists would both be bought, reorganized, and
sold by several corporate parents—with MGM ultimately
taking control of United Artists’ label and library. MGM
would emerge from a bankruptcy in 2011 by signing cofinancing and codistribution deals with other studios. [And,
in 2021, it was announced that MGM would be acquired by
Amazon.263] Universal would be purchased by talent agency
Music Corporation of America and lean heavily into television production before going through a series of sales to
Matsushita Electronic (now Panasonic), drink distributor
Seagram, General Electric and ultimately cable company
Comcast, where it would be combined with television network NBC to form NBCUniversal. Columbia Pictures would
be purchased by Sony in 1989.264

261. Schwartz, supra note 19, at 83.
262. LANDRY & GREENWALD, supra note 2, at 17.
263. Brent Lang & Todd Spangler, Amazon Buys MGM, Studio Behind James Bond, for $8.45
Billion, VARIETY (May 26, 2021, 5:37 AM), https://variety.com/2021/digital/news/amazon-buysmgm-studio-behind-james-bond-for-8-45-billion-1234980526/ [https://perma.cc/M62J-JTEL].
264. Schwartz, supra note 19, at 83–84.
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Thus, although the studios survived, they were mere shells of their
former selves, existing “as production plants, as distribution companies, [and] as familiar trademarks.”265 These “are scarcely the studio
power brokers of old . . . [i]n fact, the power of today’s conglomerated
moguls dwarfs that of their Golden Age predecessors.”266
3. Impact of COVID-19 on the Movie Industry
The COVID-19 pandemic, and the forced lockdowns that resulted, impacted many industries. For the movie industry in particular,
the pandemic not only halted production for a period of time, but
closed theaters to the public.267 This left the industry scattering, as
scheduled theatrical releases for films could not occur as planned. As
a result, some film releases were pushed to future years, while other
studios decided to release films straight to online platforms.268
With theaters closed and individuals required to stay in their
homes, streaming services dominated the entertainment landscape.
With nowhere to go and not much to do, society binged the movies
and shows available on these streaming platforms. In fact, many of the
“most-watched titles in Netflix history” were released to the platform
during the pandemic.269 Trying to capitalize on this shift, studios also
developed, acquired, or invested in their own streaming platforms.270
As the pandemic continued, studios were allowed to engage in production again, albeit with new pandemic protocols and variables that
could greatly increase the cost and time associated with producing a
picture. Some theaters opened to the public at limited capacity, but
many theaters were on the brink of bankruptcy because of the lack of
revenue.271 And, some theater chains, such as ArcLight Cinemas and

265. SCHATZ, supra note 5, at 481.
266. Id. at xi.
267. Madeline Berg, Hollywood Studios Halt Film and TV Production Amid Coronavirus,
FORBES (Mar. 13, 2020, 4:22 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/maddieberg/2020/03/13/hollywo
od-studios-disney-netflix-halt-film-and-tv-production-amid-coronavirus/ [https://perma.cc/XZJ7ALNZ]; Jake Coyle & Associated Press, Movie Theaters Across the U.S. Start Shutting Down in
Response to Coronavirus Pandemic, FORTUNE (Mar. 16, 2020, 8:36 AM), https://fortune.com/202
0/03/16/amc-theaters-audience-limits-coronavirus/ [https://perma.cc/34VJ-52PN].
268. See infra text accompanying notes 311–315.
269. Kasey Moore, Every Viewing Statistic Netflix Has Released So Far (October 2021),
WHAT’S ON NETFLIX (Oct. 25, 2021, 4:46 PM), https://www.whats-on-netflix.com/news/everyviewing-statistic-netflix-has-released-so-far-october-2021/ [https://perma.cc/2U8C-78VZ].
270. See infra text accompanying note 318.
271. Brent Lang, 5 Burning Questions for the Movie Business After the Stunning Warner Bros.HBO Max News, VARIETY (Dec. 3, 2020, 1:27 PM), https://variety.com/2020/film/news/w
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Pacific Theaters, permanently closed their locations because of the
devastating effects of the pandemic.272
The gradual importance of streaming created tension between
theaters and studios. Some studios, like Universal, promised to “open
titles on [digital] and in theaters at the same time.”273 In response,
AMC announced that it would “‘no longer play any of the [Universal]
films’ . . . cit[ing] the breaking of the 90-day window between the theatrical release and at-home distribution release as ‘unacceptable’ and
has pledged not to show any Universal film in its theaters . . . until
Universal abandons this practice.”274 Additionally, Warner Brothers
announced that all of its 2021 theatrical releases would also be concurrently released on its streaming service, HBO Max.275 Theaters,
which thrived on the exclusivity of the theatrical run, became upset,
with AMC “slamming WarnerMedia and its intent to ‘sacrifice a considerable portion of the profitability of its movie studio division.’”276
AMC and Warner Brothers reached an agreement for the 2022 season,
where Warner Brothers agreed to show its 2022 films “on the big
screen for an exclusive 45-day window.”277 This compromise cut the
traditional exclusive theatrical window278 in half (from 90 days to 45
arner-bros-hbo-max-announcement-movie-business-1234845580/ [https://perma.cc/B7CH-E5LD]
(“AMC, Cineworld and other chains are laden with debt and face the prospect of bankruptcy.”).
272. Pamela McClintock, ArcLight Cinemas and Pacific Theatres to Close, HOLLYWOOD REP.
(Apr. 12, 2021, 5:12 PM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/movies/movie-news/arclight-cine
mas-and-pacific-theatres-to-close-4165158/ [https://perma.cc/899X-JSTZ].
273. Dave McNary, AMC Theaters Won’t Play Universal Movies in Wake of ‘Trolls World
Tour’ Dispute, VARIETY (Apr. 28, 2020, 4:47 PM), https://variety.com/2020/film/news/amc-theatr
es-trolls-world-tour-dispute-1234592445/ [https://perma.cc/BZQ5-VYA2].
274. Marciszewski, supra note 65, at 263.
275. Lang, supra note 271.
276. Hoai-Tran Bui, AMC Is Not Happy with Warner Bros. 2021 HBO Max Release Plans,
Other Major Exhibitors React, SLASHFILM (Dec. 4, 2020, 7:30 AM), https://www.slashfilm.com/5
78153/amc-responds-to-warner-bros-2021-plans/ [https://perma.cc/FU7A-TXQG]; Mia Galuppo,
AMC Theatres Says Warner Bros.’ Streaming Plan Will “Sacrifice” Studio Profits, HOLLYWOOD
REP. (Dec. 3, 2020, 3:21 PM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/movies/movie-news/amc-theat
res-says-warner-bros-streaming-plan-will-sacrifice-studio-profits-4100058/ [https://perma.cc/78Q
U-AZYU] (“‘Clearly, Warner Media intends to sacrifice a considerable portion of the profitability
of its movie studio division, and that of its production partners and filmmakers, to subsidize its
HBO Max startup,’ said Adam Aron, CEO and president of AMC Entertainment, in a statement to
The Hollywood Reporter. ‘As for AMC, we will do all in our power to ensure that Warner does not
do so at our expense. We will aggressively pursue economic terms that preserve our business.’”).
277. Rebecca Rubin & Brent Lang, AMC Theaters and Warner Bros. Agree to Shorten Theatrical Window, VARIETY (Aug. 9, 2021, 2:54 PM), https://variety.com/2021/film/news/amc-theatre
s-theatrical-window-bitcoin-1235037677/ [https://perma.cc/U88Y-ADD4].
278. For a description of the typical theatrical release process, see Melanie D. Miller, Attention,
Filmmakers: Here’s Everything You Need to Know About Release Windows, INDIEWIRE (Jan. 14,
2015, 1:04 PM), https://www.indiewire.com/2015/01/attention-filmmakers-heres-everything-youneed-to-know-about-release-windows-66295/ [https://perma.cc/XGC4-HKEH].
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days) and other deals—such as the AMC-Universal deal—cut the theatrical window to only 17 days,279 pointing to a change in the movie
industry’s focus away from theaters and towards the rising dominance
of streaming platforms.
V. REVISITING THE PARAMOUNT DECREES
A. Why Now?
Termination of the Paramount Decrees was not a rash decision of
the DOJ. In fact, the view within the DOJ since the early 1980s was
that the Paramount Decrees had become irrelevant in light of changed
circumstances, and the district court has now agreed.
1. DOJ’s Revisit in the 1980s
In the early 1980s, the DOJ underwent an initiative to review “almost all antitrust consent decrees that were over ten years old,” including the Paramount Decrees, to determine whether they were “either
out of date, anticompetitive, or based on theories out of favor with the
Reagan Administration.”280 In 1981, the DOJ concluded that the Paramount Decrees had “outlived their usefulness”, and the “safeguards
that had been instigated at the suggestion of the Supreme Court were
no longer needed.”281 However, it was not “advisable [for the DOJ] to
expend its [limited] resources in seeking on its own to terminate the
decrees.”282 The DOJ signaled to the signatory studios that it would
support their private actions against the Paramount Decrees, but “the
studios were not interested enough to push for changes in court on
their own.”283 Pursuing termination or modification of consent decrees
was “very complex and expensive,”284 and the studios instead “focused on maintaining the upward trajectory of home entertainment
revenue which rose rapidly in the 1980s.”285
279. Richard Yao, The Death & Rebirth of the Theatrical Window, IPG MEDIA LAB (Aug. 13,
2020), https://medium.com/ipg-media-lab/the-death-rebirth-of-the-theatrical-window-4fe61d819a
d6 [https://perma.cc/K7MD-VWVH].
280. Fox, supra note 145, at 526.
281. Id.
282. DeBow supra note 21, at 363; Al Delugach, Justice Won’t Oppose Theater Ban on Studios: Antitrust Chief Says Industry Isn’t Interested in Seeking Change in Court, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 7,
1985, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1985-02-07-fi-5402-story.html
[https://perma.cc/2483-X3N7].
283. Delugach, supra note 282.
284. Id.
285. Schwartz, supra note 19, at 86–87.
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2. Loew’s Decree Terminated in 1992
In 1992, Loew’s, with the support of the DOJ, successfully moved
for the termination of its consent decree.286 In affirming the motion for
termination, the district court noted “that in the intervening four decades since the Loew’s Judgment was entered the motion picture exhibition business has undergone great changes, with the result that
Loews is one of only two of the many large exhibition circuits that
remain subject to the Paramount Decrees.”287 And, in light of “the
changed environment in which the . . . Loews Judgment now operates,
[the court held] there [was] no persuasive reason for maintaining the
Judgment and subjecting Loews to restrictions that do not bind other
exhibition circuits.”288
3. DOJ Seeks Termination in 2019
In 2018, the DOJ announced its initiative to review 1,300 “legacy” decrees, those entered into with no sunset provisions or termination dates.289 This initiative sparked review of the Paramount Decrees
to determine whether they “no longer serve to protect competition.”290
Similar to the findings in the 1980s and 1990s, the DOJ concluded that
“these decrees have served their purpose, and their continued existence may actually harm American consumers by standing in the way
of innovative business models for the exhibition of America’s great
creative films.”291 The movie industry that existed at the time of the
Paramount Decrees is now gone, as “none of the Paramount defendants own a significant number of theaters,” major cities “have more
than one theater,” theaters have more than one screen, and new technology has created alternate methods of viewing content.292 New competitors, such as Disney and Netflix, have come to dominate the industry, and are not subject to the prohibitions of the Paramount
Decrees.293 In light of this, and the changes in modern antitrust law,
the DOJ concluded that removing the restrictions of the Paramount
286. United States v. Loew’s Inc., 783 F. Supp. 211, 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
287. Id. at 213–14.
288. Id. at 215.
289. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 24.
290. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 26.
291. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Department of Justice Files Motion to Terminate Paramount Consent Decrees (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-filesmotion-terminate-paramount-consent-decrees [https://perma.cc/FTE9-Y932].
292. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 26.
293. See supra Sections IV.B.2.b.ii and IV.B.2.c
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Decrees for the signatory studios “can . . . lead to business practices
and innovations that benefit consumers.”294
The DOJ filed a motion to terminate the Paramount Decrees with
the Southern District Court of New York in November 2019, and, in
August 2020, the district court agreed that the changes in law and industry provide “‘a reasonable and persuasive explanation’ as to why
the termination of the Decrees would ‘serve the public interest in free
and unfettered competition,’” and granted the DOJ’s motion to terminate.295
B. Concerns of Paramount Decree Advocates
1. Studios Will Start Buying Theaters
One major concern of Paramount Decree advocates is that without the Paramount Decrees in place, both the signatory studios and
non-signatory studios will quickly begin to buy up theater circuits and
resume anticompetitive practices.296 There are two main problems
with this purported concern: (1) the Paramount Decrees never actually
prohibited anyone from buying theaters; and (2) there is no indication
that studios currently want to buy theater circuits. Each of these problems will be addressed in turn.
First and foremost, the Paramount Decrees and the prohibitions
therein are not applicable to non-signatory studios. Therefore, even if
the Paramount Decrees remained in place, studios like Disney, Netflix,
Amazon, or Lionsgate would not be bound by any of the terms, including vertical integration.297 These studios have purchased theaters;
for example, Disney owns the El Capitan Theater and Netflix owns
the Egyptian Theater in Hollywood and the Paris Theater in New
York.298

294. DOJ Memorandum, supra note 33, at 22.
295. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 2020 WL 4573069, at *3–9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7,
2020).
296. See, e.g., Tyler Riemenschneider, ‘Don’t Run up the Stairs!’: Why Removing the Paramount Decrees Would Be Bad for Hollywood, 13 OHIO ST. BUS. L.J. 334, 366–70 (2019).
297. See Brent Lang, Why Eliminating the Paramount Antitrust Decrees Won’t Shake Up the
Movie Business, VARIETY (Nov. 19, 2019, 3:07 PM), https://variety.com/2019/film/news/para
mount-antitrust-consent-decrees-movie-business-analysis-1203409589/ [https://perma.cc/D68LPFMN].
298. Austin Goslin, Major Antitrust Ruling Clears the Way for Movie Studios to Own Theaters,
POLYGON (Aug. 7, 2020, 12:04 PM), https://www.polygon.com/2020/8/7/21358637/movie-theater
-antitrust-laws-paramount-consent-decrees-movie-studios-theater-chains-netflix-disney [https://pe
rma.cc/ET7N-9V2M]; Eriq Gardner, Judge Agrees to End Paramount Consent Decrees,
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Additionally, it is a common misconception that the Paramount
ruling held vertical “integration of the business of distribution with
exhibition illegal.”299 Although the Paramount defendants’ vertical integration was an “active aid[] to the conspiracy and [was thus] rendered … illegal” on those facts, vertical integration may be legal in
other situations.300 This is supported by the Court’s refusal to find vertical integration of production, distribution, and exhibition of films per
se illegal.301 And, though the Paramount Decrees did require that the
Five Majors divest of their theater holdings, it did not strictly prohibit
any defendant from acquiring theaters thereafter.302 Fox, Loew’s (now
MGM), and Warner Brothers were required to gain the court’s approval before purchasing theaters, while Paramount, Universal, Columbia, and United Artists had no restrictions and have “always been
free to acquire theaters.”303 In fact, the signatory studios controlled
theaters years before the Paramount Decrees were terminated.304 However, despite being able to purchase theaters, “modern film studios [are

HOLLYWOOD REP. (Aug. 7, 2020, 7:50 AM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/business/busine
ss-news/judge-agrees-end-paramount-consent-decrees-1306387/ [https://perma.cc/XT8D-5QFX].
299. Phillips, supra note 147, at 11.
300. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 881, 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Phillips,
supra note 147, at 11.
301. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 173–74 (1948) (“Exploration of
these phases of the cases would not be necessary if, as the Department of Justice argues, vertical
integration of producing, distributing and exhibiting motion pictures is illegal per se. But the majority of the Court does not take that view. In the opinion of the majority the legality of vertical
integration under the Sherman Act turns on (1) the purpose or intent with which it was conceived,
or (2) the power it creates and the attendant purpose or intent.”); see also Paramount, 85 F. Supp.
at 893 (“While vertical integration would not per se violate the Sherman Act . . . . We do not suggest
that every vertically integrated company which engages in restraints of trade or conspiracies will
thereby render its vertical integration illegal.”).
302. DOJ Memorandum, supra note 33, at 11, 31.
303. Id. at 31.
304. By 1987, approximately 40 years after the Paramount Decrees, “Gulf Western (Paramount) own[ed] Mann Theaters (360 screens), Trans-Lux (24 screens), and Festival Enterprises
(101 screens). It also own[ed] Famous Players Ltd. (469 screens), a leading Canadian circuit. Columbia Pictures (Columbia) own[ed] approximately 35 percent of Tri-Star Pictures which own[ed]
Loew’s Theaters (300 screens) and Music Makers Theaters (65 screens). Columbia own[ed] Walter
Reade Organization (11 screens). MCA, the parent corporation of Universal Pictures (Universal),
own[ed] 50 percent of Cineplex Odeon Corp. (Cineplex), which reportedly ha[d] 1,550 screens in
the United states and Canada. Cineplex own[ed] Plitt Theaters (692 screens), Septum Theaters (48
screens), Essaness Theaters (41 screens), Sterling Recreation Organizations (100 screens, and in
addition, licenses pictures for 30 other screens) and Neighborhood Theaters (76 screens). Through
a separate subsidiary, it also own[ed] the RKO Century Warner chain, which include[d] the prestigious Cinema Five division (97 screens).” Phillips, supra note 147, at 20–21 n.1; see also Conant,
supra note 8, at 80–105.
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not] vertically integrated in any way with the theaters that exhibit their
films to the public.”305
Nonetheless, some critics of Paramount Decree termination are
worried that without the Paramount Decrees, major studios will target
purchases of national theater circuits, such as AMC, Cinemark, or Regal, and engage in anticompetitive conduct.306 Furthermore, there was
concern that the COVID-19 pandemic would set the stage for such an
acquisition as theaters were struggling financially.307 There is little evidence that such a concern will come to fruition. When asked whether
studios would be interested in buying major theater circuits that were
on the “brink of bankruptcy” due to the COVID-19 pandemic shutdowns, executives from Universal and Warner Brothers stated the studios had no intention of doing so.308 There have been rumored talks of
Amazon acquiring AMC Theaters but, as it turned out, it was nothing
more than rumors.309 Since the initial announcement in May of 2020,
no news of continued talks between Amazon and AMC have emerged.
However, even if Amazon were to purchase AMC, the acquisition
would have no bearing on whether the Paramount Decrees should be
terminated because Amazon is not bound by the decrees.310
In fact, the trend arising from the COVID-19 pandemic suggests
that studios might turn away from theaters and theatrical releases to
focus on streaming services. Warner Brothers decided to simultaneously release all of its 2021 films onto HBO Max.311 Paramount sold
“a half-dozen titles to streamers like Netflix and Amazon, taking hard
305. Flagship Theaters of Palm Desert, LLC v. Century Theaters, Inc., 269 Cal. Rptr. 3d 446,
464 (Ct. App. 2020).
306. DOJ Memorandum, supra note 33, at 30.
307. Maureen Lee Lenker, Opinion, Why the End of the Paramount Decrees Is Bad for Movies
and Movie Theaters, ENT. WKLY. (Aug. 7, 2020, 2:35 PM), https://ew.com/movies/judge-endsparamount-decrees/ [https://perma.cc/B26J-FBXX].
308. Dade Hayes, Warner Bros & Universal Bosses Say No Movie Theater Buyouts in the
Works, but “We’re Rooting for Them,” DEADLINE (Oct. 15, 2021, 1:55 PM), https://deadline.com/2
020/10/warner-bros-universal-bosses-movie-theater-buyouts-covid-19-1234598176/ [https://perm
a.cc/Z5EK-U4J7].
309. Rachel Labonte, Movie Theatres May Be Acquired by Amazon, SCREEN RANT (May 11,
2020), https://screenrant.com/amazon-buying-movie-theaters-amc/ [https://perma.cc/WM4N-EPY
A].
310. DOJ Memorandum, supra note 33, at 21.
311. Steve Kovach, Your Movie Theater Experience Is Going Extinct, CNBC (Dec. 7, 2020,
3:31 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/04/warner-bros-to-release-movies-on-hbo-max-threate
ning-theatrical-windows.html [https://perma.cc/3EXH-ZKSE]; Anthony D’Alessandro, Warner
Bros Sets Entire 2021 Movie Slate to Debut on HBO Max Along with Cinemas in Seismic Windows
Model Shakeup, DEADLINE (Dec. 3, 2020, 10:30 AM), https://deadline.com/2020/12/warner-bros2021-movie-slate-hbo-max-matrix-4-dune-in-the-heights-1234649760/ [https://perma.cc/RL3J-N
92M].
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cash over an ambiguous [financial] future.”312 Universal began to experiment with video on demand,313 and Disney utilized its streaming
service, Disney+, to release some movies concurrently with theaters.314 Disney also utilized Disney+ to launch franchises, such as The
Mandalorian, and to cut the theatrical window of exclusivity for some
releases in half, releasing the films on Disney+ 45 days after their theatrical release.315 Even independents are beginning to enter the streaming space with their own streaming service.316
Ironically, against the fears of Paramount Decree advocates, theaters may need integration with studios to serve as a lifeboat from
bankruptcy.317 However, the studios have indicated no interest in buying theater circuits and have instead focused their efforts on developing, acquiring (or being acquired by), and working with streaming services: Disney, with Disney+ and Hulu; Paramount, with Paramount+;
Universal, with Peacock; Warner Brothers, with HBO Max; MGM

312. Tom Brueggemann, Why Would Studios Suggest Abandoning Theaters? Some Logic Behind the Strategy, INDIEWIRE (Oct. 14, 2020, 8:30 AM), https://www.indiewire.com/2020/10/whystudios-suggest-abandoning-theaters-disney-strategy-1234591873/ [https://perma.cc/PWU5-NJW
B].
313. Id.
314. Brian Truitt, Disney+ Will Keep Streaming Big Movies in 2021 as ‘Free Guy’ and ‘ShangChi’ Adjust Strategy, USA TODAY (May 13, 2021, 6:42 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/en
tertainment/movies/2021/05/13/disney-streaming-movies-2021-free-guy-shang-chi-theaters-chap
ek/5081434001/ [https://perma.cc/AA24-9NLJ].
315. Id. Pixar has also released several movies straight to Disney+, skipping theaters altogether.
Jordan Moreau, Pixar’s ‘Turning Red’ Skips Theaters, Will Debut on Disney Plus in March,
VARIETY (Jan. 7, 2022, 12:39 PM), https://variety.com/2022/film/news/turning-red-disney-pluspixar-skip-theaters-1235149234/ [https://perma.cc/3AGH-K58V] (“Pixar’s upcoming film ‘Turning Red’ is skipping theaters and will debut exclusively on Disney Plus on March 11, . . . follow[ing] ‘Soul’ and ‘Luca’ as fellow Pixar releases that went straight to the streaming platform
during the COVID-19 pandemic.”).
316. Valerie Complex, Slamdance Launches Streaming Platform The Slamdance Channel,
DEADLINE (Jan. 11, 2022, 9:00 AM), https://deadline.com/2022/01/slamdance-channel-streamingsite-launches-1234907785/ [https://perma.cc/QXJ2-3R66] (“Slamdance will debut a new streaming platform for independent films, . . . providing creators with maximum opportunities to reach
movie audiences.”).
317. “Domestic box office is on pace to plummet more than 80% in the U.S., as theaters in New
York and LA remain shuttered more than seven months after the pandemic started sweeping across
the U.S. As exhibitors have launched a promotional campaign about their safety measures and enlisted top filmmakers for a plea to Congress, a bailout plan—even from private equity firms buying
up other 20th century assets like newspapers and radio stations—has not emerged.” Hayes, supra
note 308; see also Hoai-Tran Bui, Major Hollywood Studios Won’t Be Buying Out Movie Theaters
Any Time Soon, SLASHFILM (Oct. 16, 2021, 11:20 AM), https://www.slashfilm.com/577253/mov
ie-theater-buyouts-hollywood-studios/ [https://perma.cc/9FUX-X774] (“For theaters to truly survive, the movie industry may need to go back to the Classic Hollywood model of studios owning
stakes in exhibitors.”).
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(formerly Loew’s), with Amazon Prime; as well as Netflix and Amazon forming studios to develop their own content.318
The concern that termination of the Paramount Decrees will lead
to the vertical integration that resulted in the illegal restraints of trade
in 1948 is unfounded. As explained above, nothing in the Paramount
Decrees actually barred signatory studios and non-signatory studios
from owning theaters, and even when presented with an opportunity
to do so, the signatory studios have shown no interest in purchasing
major theater circuits.
2. The Practice of Block Booking Will Resume Without the
Paramount Decrees
Another major concern of the Paramount Decree advocates is that
after the two-year sunset provision (from the court’s termination order
in 2020), the practice of block booking will resume in full force, harming small theaters and independent producers.319 It is first important to
note that the only block booking prohibited by the Court and Paramount Decrees was conditional block booking, where exhibitors were
forced to buy additional movies to get the one they wanted.320 The
Court explicitly stated that it was “not suggest[ing] that films may not
be sold in blocks or groups, when there is no requirement, express or
implied, for the purchase of more than one film.”321 And, in fact, unconditional block booking has been used following Paramount.322
It has since been suggested that the nature of the Paramount defendants’ block booking was not to force the purchase of an entire slate
of films, but rather to “cheaply provide in quantity a product needed
in quantity.”323 The blocks were beneficial because they reduced the

318. Marciszewski, supra note 65, at 279–80; Joshua Glick, Studio Branding in the Streaming
Wars, L.A. REV. BOOKS (June 24, 2021), https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/studio-branding-inthe-streaming-wars/ [https://perma.cc/YA9W-FSMP]; Cynthia Littleton, Paramount Plus to
Launch March 4 in U.S. and Latin America, VARIETY (Jan. 19, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://variety.com
/2021/tv/festivals/paramount-plus-streaming-debut-march-4-viacomcbs-1234887452/ [https://per
ma.cc/49B4-M42A].
319. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Theatre Owners, supra note 30, at 6–8; Marciszewski, supra note
65, at 256–57.
320. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 159 (1948); Paramount Decree,
supra note 12, § II(A)(7).
321. Paramount, 334 U.S. at 159.
322. F. Andrew Hanssen, The Block Booking of Films Reexamined, 43 J.L. & ECON. 395, 419–
20, 422 (2000); see also id. at 420 n.91 (“For example, in 1950, 3,700 theaters chose to book Paramount pictures in blocks with a right to cancel 20 percent.”).
323. Id. at 397.
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costs and time commitment associated with licensing films.324 The evidence found in licensing contracts and practices between the Paramount defendants and exhibitors supports this position: the major studios did not require the purchase of entire blocks and the number of
films, as well as the duration of runs, was flexible.325 This was a direct
result of the profit-sharing licensing scheme used and the importance
of maintaining good relationships with the exhibitors (and vice
versa).326 Additionally, the licensing contracts contained cancellation
clauses that allowed exhibitors to cancel a license if the cost for the
film was too high, and the right to refuse (usually) 10 percent of contracted-for films.327 Although the exhibitors were allowed to do so, the
cancellation clauses were rarely used to their fullest.328 The licensing
contracts also allowed exhibitors to roll over unshown films to the following season, and even “exchange [them] for agreements to show
newer films.”329
Nonetheless, the conditional block booking feared by Paramount
Decree advocates is entirely speculative, and evidence points to the
conclusion that such practice will not be revived with termination of
the Paramount Decrees. First, the major studios are producing a much
smaller number of movies than in the pre-Paramount era, 330 supporting the conclusion that conditional block booking is not as big a threat
324. Id. at 400 (“An exhibitor trade association noted in 1938, ‘The exhibitor is in the position
of buying a sufficient quantity of quality product for his theater to insure a continuous supply of
merchantable pictures. To quit block booking would be to greatly increase the price of pictures;’”
when Famous-Players Lasky experimented with individual selling of films in the early 1920s, it
“estimated that its sales force would have to be quadrupled, sales and overhead costs doubled, and
the price per picture raised by 40 percent.”); CONANT, supra note 39, at 145 (“Many exhibitors . . .
found negotiating for each picture individually too time consuming and preferred to buy films in
groups.”).
325. Hanssen, supra note 322, at 409–11, 415.
326. See id. at 396.
327. Id. at 412–13 (“Film exhibitors could use the cancellation clause to adjust, at the margin,
the number of films they actually accepted and thus vary play dates in line with demand without
worrying that they might not be able to show all the films they contracted for. The cancellation
clause was a standard feature of block-booked contracts, and 10 percent was the standard minimum.”).
328. Id. at 415.
329. Id. at 414 (“‘[E]very member of the sales organization knew that a large proportion of all
cancellations consisted of adjustments made to exhibitors to further the sales of the new season’s
pictures.’ Such cancellations were a loss for accounting purposes only; . . . ‘[t]hey knew that the
exhibitor had only so many days in the year to show pictures and that if all the time was taken up,
the mere substitution of new pictures for old pictures was not a real loss of business.’” (quoting
FBO Productions, Inc.: Decrease of Number of Cancellations in Contracts, 8 HARV. BUS. REPS.:
CASES ON MOTION PICTURE INDUS. 391, 395, 396 (1930))).
330. LANDRY & GREENWALD, supra note 2, at 12, 16.
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as it was in the Paramount era. Unlike the old days, the studios no
longer have a guaranteed forum of exhibition or contracted talent to
easily produce films. And, with the decline of the star system, the major studios must put money into not only producing but also marketing
these films to the decreasing movie-going public. Pre-Paramount,
“more than 65% of the population went to the movies weekly” in the
United States,331 and the “major studios made virtually all of the movies that people saw.”332 Since the 1960s, an average of a little below
10 percent attend the movies weekly,333 and the studios now only
make a small fraction of the total theatrically released movies.334
Therefore, because of the Paramount defendants’ focus on producing
blockbuster titles (as noted in Section IV.B.1.a), there are fewer available movies for the Paramount defendants to tie, even if they wanted
to do so.
Additionally, the rise in multiplexes alters the theatrical landscape: exhibitors are no longer limited to one screen. Therefore, even
if the studios engaged in some form of conditional block booking, it
would not result in the exclusion of other producers from theaters since
exhibitors have many more screens available at any given time. And,
331. Caterina Cowden, Movie Attendance Has Been on a Dismal Decline Since the 1940s, BUS.
INSIDER (Jan. 6, 2015, 4:35 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/movie-attendance-over-theyears-2015-1 [https://perma.cc/HQ8E-AJH4].
332. EPSTEIN, supra note 212, at 23.
333. Cowden, supra note 331. In light of the COVID-19 pandemic, the number of potential
moviegoers has continued to decrease. Andrew Ross Sorkin et al., Must the Shows Go On?, N.Y.
TIMES: DEALBOOK (Jan. 10, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/10/business/dealbook/holl
ywood-pandemic-box-office.html [https://perma.cc/SP9B-TR86] (“According to a recent study, 49
percent of prepandemic moviegoers are no longer buying tickets. Eight percent say they will never
return.”).
334. In 2019, “over 900 films [were] shown in theaters.” Marciszewski, supra note 65, at 26768. In 2019, Paramount released 11 movies, MGM released 2 movies, 20th Century Fox released
13 movies, Sony (which owns Columbia Pictures) released 24 movies, Warner Brothers released
43 movies, Universal released 26 movies, and United Artists released 6 movies. Box Office History
for Paramount Pictures, THE NUMBERS, https://www.the-numbers.com/market/distributor/Paramo
unt-Pictures [https://perma.cc/A97T-S249]; Box Office History for MGM, THE NUMBERS, https://
www.the-numbers.com/market/distributor/MGM [https://perma.cc/WXZ7-ZX7P]; Box Office History for 20th Century Fox, THE NUMBERS, https://www.the-numbers.com/market/distributor/20thCentury-Fox [https://perma.cc/3DAE-UYLQ]; Box Office History for Sony Pictures, THE
NUMBERS, https://www.the-numbers.com/market/distributor/Sony-Pictures [https://perma.cc/3DA
E-UYLQ]; Box Office History for Warner Bros., THE NUMBERS, https://www.the-numbers.com
/market/distributor/Warner-Bros [https://perma.cc/E8MY-U3HS]; Box Office History for Universal, THE NUMBERS, https://www.the-numbers.com/market/distributor/Universal [https://perma.cc
/RLW7-5BDM]; Box Office History for United Artists, THE NUMBERS, https://www.the-num
bers.com/market/distributor/United-Artists [https://perma.cc/Z7XJ-MY2D]. In total, the Paramount defendants released 125 of at least 900 movies in 2019, or at most 13.89 percent, as opposed
to the 316/508, or 62.2 percent, of movies released in the 1934–1939 seasons. See CONANT, supra
note 39, at 36.
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lastly, the rise of streaming platforms not only provides independent
producers another method to release their films, but also gives studios
an avenue to release their lower-tiered movies without having to use
conditional block booking. As noted above, the signatory studios each
have developed, purchased, or invested in a streaming platform, and
these platforms can be used as an alternative method to release these
lower-quality, non-blockbuster movies.
Some have argued that lifting the prohibition on conditional block
booking will inevitably result in the foreclosure of independent movies from theaters that desire this content.335 However, many of these
independent and small theaters do not focus on playing content from
Hollywood studios, rather, “[m]any [of them] primarily play films
from independent studios and distributors [and] foreign films.”336
These theaters “cater to niche audiences and aren’t wholly reliant, if
at all, on the Hollywood machine.”337 Furthermore, courts have even
recognized this independent market as distinct from Hollywood movies, referring to these theaters as “specialty theaters”: theaters that
show “specialty films,” including “independent films, art films, foreign films, and documentaries . . . [which] unlike mainstream commercial films . . . are not intended to appeal to a broad audience.”338
Therefore, the argument that the Paramount Decrees, if terminated,
will disallow independent theaters from showing independent films is
unconvincing.
Lastly, the fact that none of the signatory studios aided or supported the DOJ’s push for termination of the Paramount Decrees339
indicates that these studios have no desire to revert to the practices
prohibited by the Paramount Decrees, including block booking. Had
335. See, e.g., Writers Guild of Am., supra note 31, at 6; Amicus Curiae Independent Cinema
Alliance’s Memorandum in Opposition to the Department of Justice’s Motion to Terminate the
Paramount Consent Decrees at 2, 2 n.2, United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., No. 19-mc-00544
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2020) [hereinafter ICA Amicus].
336. Dawson Oler, Note, Netflix, Disney+, & A Decision of Paramount Importance, 2020 U.
ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 481, 499.
337. Cara Buckley, How New York’s Small Cinemas Are Hanging On, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/27/movies/nyc-indie-movie-theaters.html [https://perm
a.cc/9ZRN-MNNN].
338. 2301 M Cinema LLC v. Silver Cinemas Acquisition Co., 342 F. Supp. 3d 126, 129 (D.D.C.
2018).
339. See Paramount Consent Decree Review Public Comments 2018, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/atr/paramount-consent-decree-review-public-comments-2018 [https://per
ma.cc/6JWF-K9M4] (listing all of the public comments submitted to the DOJ to assist in its determination of whether the Paramount Decrees were still necessary to protect competition, and no
comments were submitted by any of the signatory studios).
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the signatory studios desired to do so, logically one would have seen
them be more involved in the process, working with the DOJ to repeal
the Paramount Decrees. Or, alternatively, one would have expected
the see the studios move for termination on their own volition (with
the DOJ’s support) before the DOJ initiated its review of the legacy
decrees. Instead, however, the DOJ sought to terminate the Paramount
Decrees unilaterally.
3. The Paramount Decrees Are Necessary to Protect Small and
Independent Competitors
In its brief opposing termination of the Paramount Decrees, the
Independent Cinema Alliance (ICA), which represents 236 independent cinema companies, “urge[d] preserving the Paramount . . . Decrees, which foremost seek to protect independent cinemas.”340 ICA
argued that for independent competitors, the Paramount “Decrees constitute a continuing lifeline, a way to remain competitive in an industry
still inclined to anticompetitive abuse.”341
Citing the language of the Supreme Court in Paramount, ICA
characterized the purpose of the Paramount litigation as protecting independent and small competitors:
The trade victims of this conspiracy have in large measure
been the small independent operators. They are the ones that
have felt most keenly the discriminatory practices and predatory activities in which defendants have freely indulged.
They have been the victims of the massed purchasing power
of the larger units in the industry. It is largely out of the ruins
of the small operators that the large empires of exhibitors
have been built.342
There is no argument against this characterization of the case; the
Court was trying to protect smaller competitors. The Court’s view in
Paramount was in line with similar cases of its time, expressing a willingness to use antitrust to protect small, independent businesses.
For example, in Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,343 a
small independently operated store alleged that Broadway-Hale, a
chain of department stores, and ten other national manufactures

340.
341.
342.
343.

ICA Amicus, supra note 335, at 1.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 1 (quoting Paramount Pictures II, 334 U.S. 131, 162 (1948)).
359 U.S. 207 (1959).
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“conspired to restrain and monopolize commerce.”344 The lower
courts granted summary judgment for the defendants, stating that this
was a “purely private quarrel” that did not “amount to a ‘public wrong
proscribed by the Sherman Act.’”345 The Supreme Court, reversing the
lower courts, held that defendant’s actions “interfere[] with the natural
flow of interstate commerce. It clearly has, by its ‘nature’ and ‘character,’ a ‘monopolistic tendency.’ As such it is not to be tolerated
merely because the victim is just one merchant whose business is so
small that his destruction makes little difference to the economy.”346
Similarly, in Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke
Co.,347 a manufacturer brought suit against an association and its members, alleging a combination and conspiracy to restrain interstate commerce.348 The lower courts again granted a motion for summary judgment because there was no harm to the public.349 The Supreme Court
reversed and followed its decision in Klor’s stating that the size of the
company does not matter—rather, “to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted under that section, allegations adequate to show a violation and, in a private treble damage action, that plaintiff was damaged thereby are all the law requires.”350
However, the Court’s views have since shifted away from this
approach. This shift was “doctrinal. The Court concentrated on sharpening the element of proper enforcement within antitrust, namely ensuring that antitrust law focused on the integrity of the competitive
process and not the viability of individual competitors.”351 As early as
1962, two years after the Radiant Burners decision, the Court indicated as much, stating that antitrust laws were passed for “the protection of competition, not competitors.”352 By the 1990s, the Court
shifted away from protecting small business and diffusing economic
power as the goal of antitrust, holding instead that in circumstances
similar to the allegations in Klor’s and Radiant Burners, “the plaintiff
. . . must allege and prove harm, not just to a single competitor, but to
344. Id. at 208.
345. Id. at 210 (emphasis added).
346. Id. at 213 (emphasis added).
347. 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
348. Id. at 657.
349. Id. at 658–59.
350. Id. at 659–60.
351. Daniel M. Tracer, Stare Decisis in Antitrust: Continuity, Economics, and the Common
Law Statute, 12 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 1, 20–21 (2013).
352. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
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the competitive process, i.e., to competition itself.”353 For, “the purpose of the [Sherman] Act is not to protect businesses from the working of the market; it is to protect the public from the failure of the
market.”354
Therefore, ICA’s argument that the Paramount Decrees should
remain intact to protect small competitors is not convincing. ICA
would need to show that without the Paramount Decrees, there would
be harm to competition itself, not independent competitors.355 Instead,
ICA attempts to use antitrust in a manner directly against the Supreme
Court’s description of its purpose noted above—ICA wants to maintain the Paramount Decrees in an attempt to protect independent theaters from the workings of the market: “Independents already dwell in
a kind of perpetual existential angst, and the economic challenges of
running a cinema continue to mount. . . . Independents need to see a
steadfast commitment to the principles of fairness so succinctly embodied in the Paramount . . . Decrees . . . .”356
C. Changes in Antitrust Law Make It Unfair to Hold Different
Competitors to Different Standards
As noted in Section IV.A above, the Court has modified its approach to various business practices banned by the Paramount Decrees. Consequently, all that is lost by termination of the Paramount
Decrees is “a vague sense of special treatment that came from circumstances long gone, with little practical application.”357 Vertical restraints are now analyzed under the rule of reason, making it unfair
that only a handful of studios are still bound the Paramount Decrees’
per se ruling. The DOJ stated that “[c]onsistent with modern antitrust
law, the Division will review the vertical practices initially prohibited
by the Paramount decrees using the rule of reason. . . . If credible

353. NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 135 (1998) (emphasis added).
354. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993).
355. This argument is based on the current standing of antitrust law. As mentioned infra in
Section V.C, there is a robust debate happening at this moment among Congress and academics
regarding antitrust law, including whether there needs to be a return to using antitrust to protect
independent competitors.
356. ICA Amicus, supra note 335, at 20.
357. Tom Brueggemann, Theaters Have Many Problems, but the Consent Decrees Weren’t
One, INDIEWIRE (Aug. 7, 2020, 6:29 PM), https://www.indiewire.com/2020/08/theaters-manyproblems-but-the-consent-decrees-werent-one-1234578739/ [https://perma.cc/83XE-HL2D].
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evidence shows a practice harms consumer welfare, antitrust enforcers
remain ready to act.”358
Additionally, the modern trend for tying arrangements, such as
block booking, is pushing toward rule of reason analysis. And, the
Court has backed away from its willingness to use antitrust to protect
individual competitors. To keep the Paramount Decrees intact would
go against the goals of modern antitrust case law and result in harming
competition, as competitors in today’s movie industry landscape are
held to different standards.
Moreover, the movie industry market definition has changed
since the days of Paramount. Market definition is an often heavily litigated portion of antitrust cases, as the power of the defendant is measured by their control of the defined market. During the era of Paramount, the movie industry market was, at its broadest, theaters in
general and, at its narrowest, the type of theater (first-run, second-run,
third-run theaters, etc.). Now, however, at its broadest, the movie industry market includes not only theaters, but in-home entertainment
(television, DVDs, and streaming platforms). And, at its narrowest, it
is theaters (which as noted in Section IV.B above, are very different
from the single-screen theaters of old). The Court in Paramount defined the market as first-run theaters (taking the narrow definition).359
Even if the same approach is used in a modern action following termination of the Paramount Decrees, the market definition would, at its
narrowest, be theaters since specific run theaters no longer really exist.360 Therefore, the broadening of the market definition from the time
of Paramount is important when noting the post-Paramount changes
in antitrust analysis.
Furthermore, even if the signatory studios do resort to the feared
anticompetitive behavior outlawed by the Paramount Decrees, they
are not exempt from antitrust scrutiny. The National Theater Organization agreed, stating: “We agree with the Court that anti-competitive
behavior remains anti-competitive under existing antitrust law. This
358. Dana Harris-Bridson, No, Studios Won’t Buy Theaters, but Small Exhibitors Fear Destruction While DOJ Touts Innovation, INDIEWIRE (Nov. 20, 2019, 1:07 PM), https://www.indiewire
.com/2019/11/paramount-consent-decrees-studios-wont-buy-theaters-1202190582/ [https://perma
.cc/4M6R-53H4].
359. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 881, 894 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); see also
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 167 (1948).
360. “[M]ajor films are released broadly to thousands of multi-screen theaters at the same time
in a single theatrical run.” United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., No. 19 MISC. 544, 2020 WL
4573069, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2020).
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decision simply shifts the mechanism for enforcement into regular,
existing channels.”361 And, repealing the Paramount Decrees does not
invalidate the law surrounding the Paramount defendants’ illegal business practices that have remained unaltered since the Supreme Court’s
Paramount holding.362
Additionally, since the Paramount Decrees were signed, the HartScott-Rodino Act,363 implemented in 1976, provides antitrust authorities with the opportunity to review and challenge most “mergers and
acquisitions that are likely to reduce competition and lead to higher
prices, lower quality goods or services, or less innovation.”364 Therefore, if any major studio tried to buy a major theater chain, as feared
by Paramount Decree advocates,365 there are now processes in place
to block such mergers if they would lead to anticompetitive practices,
including those used by the vertically integrated studios prior to the
Paramount litigation.
With the rise of antitrust in the spotlight of current events (specifically with its role in addressing concerns raised by big tech), there is
debate about whether antitrust law, as it stands, is sufficient to prohibit
and enforce anticompetitive behavior or if the Sherman Act should be
updated.366 Whether antitrust law must be amended is another question, outside the scope of this Comment. Assuming arguendo that current antitrust law is inadequate, does that mean that the regulations of
the Paramount Decrees should stay intact for only a few competitors
in the motion picture industry? The answer is no, as removing restrictions will promote competition and innovation in the market. The
termination of the Paramount Decrees allows the Paramount defendants to better compete with rising powerhouses such as Disney, Netflix, and Amazon.

361. Brueggemann, supra note 357.
362. See Schwartz, supra note 19, at 106.
363. 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (2018).
364. Merger Review, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/merger-review
[https://perma.cc/2REC-67YA].
365. See supra Section V.B.1.
366. See, e.g., A. Douglas Melamed, Antitrust Law and Its Critics, 83 ANTITRUST L.J. 269, 269
(2020); Andrew Ross Sorkin et al., Why Apple Didn’t Lose in the Epic Games Ruling, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Oct. 8, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/13/business/dealbook/apple-epicfortnite-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/W4C3-KCLT] (“‘The ruling shows the gap between the
popular perception of what is a monopoly and what the law says’. . . . And that, in turn, ‘gives those
pushing to change the laws in Congress pretty good ammunition.’”).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Paramount Decrees were necessary when originally entered
into due to the then-existing status of antitrust jurisprudence and the
structure of the movie industry. However, post-Paramount changes to
the movie industry, including the rise of new competitors, new avenues for entertainment, multiplexes, and, most recently, the impact of
the COVID-19 pandemic have created an industry in which the conduct prohibited by the Paramount Decrees is unlikely to occur again.
Additionally, the Supreme Court has relaxed its views on several antitrust doctrines, which the Paramount Decrees strictly held to be per
se violations. Terminating the Paramount Decrees allows the signatory
studios to compete with non-signatory studios on a level playing field.
The concerns of Paramount Decree advocates are unsupported by law
and fact and, therefore, the district court was right to terminate the
Paramount Decrees.

